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reform including a damages cap could make a useful contribution to
health care reform. By providing guaranteed access to health care
insurance at community rates, the ACA could reduce the problem of
under-compensation resulting from damages caps. However, it may
also exacerbate the problem of under-claiming in the malpractice sys-
tem, thereby reducing incentives to invest in loss prevention activities.
Shifting losses from liability insurers to health insurers could further
undermine the already weak deterrent effect of the medical liability
system. Republicans in Congress and physician groups both pushed
for the adoption of a federal damages cap as part of health care re-
form. Physician support for damages caps could be explained by con-
cerns about the insurance cycle and the consequent instability of the
market. Our own study presented here suggests that there is greater
insurance market stability in states with caps on non-economic dam-
ages. Republicans in Congress argued that the enactment of damages
caps would reduce aggregate health care costs. The Congressional
Budget Office included savings from reduced health care utilization in
its estimates of cost savings that would result from the enactment of a
federal damages cap. But notwithstanding recent opinions offered by
the CBO, it is not clear that caps will significantly reduce health care
costs or that any savings will be passed on to consumers. The ACA
included funding for state level demonstration projects for promising
reforms such as offer and disclosure and health courts, but at this time
the benefits of these reforms are also uncertain. There is a need for
further studies on these issues.
INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has ushered in a
new era of health care in the United States.' While the legislation re-
mains controversial, its commitment to universal access is likely to
have a significant and enduring impact on the health care system.
There was a chance that alternative medical liability reforms (e.g.,
disclosure and offer, health courts, safe harbors) would be bundled
with the health care reform as part of a bipartisan compromise,2 but it
was not included in the final legislation. The ACA does, however,
include funding for state-level demonstration projects that test mal-
practice reform alternatives.3 No doubt the failure to include medical
"ACA" as used in this paper refers to the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) amended by Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub.L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
2 Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Role of Medical Liability
Reform in Federal Health Care Reform, 361 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1, 1-2 (2009).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 10607.
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liability reform was due to the facts that there was not a malpractice
insurance crisis at the time of passage, and that the prevailing view
among Democrat legislators was that malpractice reform was "a Re-
publican issue."
Although it was highly unlikely that health care reform legislation
would include damages caps, they were much discussed during the
debate. In fact, damages caps emerged as a primary component of
Republican alternatives to the proposed Democratic health reform bill.
And the notion that significant savings could result from the adoption
of a federal cap on non-economic damages received some unlikely
support during the debate. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
found that the federal enactment of medical liability reform-
including a cap on non-economic damages of $250,00(-would re-
duce federal budget deficits by $54 billion over the period of 2009-
2019.5 In making this calculation, CBO included savings from
changed health care utilization, i.e., a reduction in defensive medicine,
as a result of federal medical liability reform.6 This marked the first
time that CBO included savings from decreased utilization of health
care in its estimates of the cost savings from traditional medical liabil-
ity reforms.
With the Democrats in control of the Senate, damage caps will not
be enacted any time soon; they have consistently opposed attempts to
enact a federal damages cap. The opposition to damages caps by Con-
gressional Democrats is based on a legitimate policy disagreement
with Republicans: Democrats view damages caps as unfairly penaliz-
ing the most severely injured victims of malpractice and unlikely to
reduce health care costs significantly.
The divide between Republicans and Democrats on damages caps
became even more apparent at the summit on health care reform con-
vened by President Obama on February 25, 2010. In his opening
statement, Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN) identified federal enact-
ment of traditional malpractice reform measures as a central plank of
4 Mello & Brennan, supra note 2, at 1.
5 Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Sen.
Orrin G. Hatch 5 (Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Hatch Letter], available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/docl0641/10-09-Tort Reform.pdf.
6 Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Sen.
John D. Rockefeller IV I (Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Rockefeller Letter], available
at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/docl0802/12-10-Medical Malpractice.pdf.
See id.; see also Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget
Office, to Hon. Bruce L. Braley 1 (Dec. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Braley Letter] (detail-
ing reasons for change), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/
doc10872/12-29-TortReform-Braley.pdf.
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the Republican health care reform proposal. Senator John McCain
(R-AZ) pointed to the effectiveness of damages caps adopted in Cali-
fornia and Texas in improving access and reducing health care costs.
Senator McCain claimed that the adoption by Texas of a $250,000 cap
on non-economic damages in 2003 dramatically reduced medical lia-
bility insurance premiums and increased the number of physicians
moving to Texas. He also claimed that the reforms had reduced defen-
sive medicine expenditures, noting that "defensive medicine increases
annual medical costs by 10 percent."9 Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK), a
practicing physician, acknowledged that he had practiced defensive
8 Sen. Lamar Alexander Makes Opening Remarks at White House Health
Summit, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2010, 11:39 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022502481.html.
9 Senator McCain stated:
MCCAIN: And the-and the point is that we don't have to go very far.
There's two examples right now of medical malpractice reform that is
working. One's called California, the other called-called Texas.
I won't talk about California, because the Arizonans hate California, be-
cause they've stolen our water. But the fact is that Texas has established a
$750,000 stack cap (ph) for non-economic damages, caps doctors at
$250,000, hospitals at $250,000, and any additional institution $250,000,
and patient's harmed do-do a finding (ph) of medical malpractice are not
subject to any limitations on recoveries for economic losses. And I hope
you'll examine it.
But the important aspect of what they've done in Texas is the following.
Lawsuit filings are down. Medical cost-defensive medicine increases an-
nual medical costs by 10 percent. They've saved 200 physicians-
recruitment is up. In the last two years, 6,945 new physicians have been li-
censed, 65 percent increase from two years preceding their reforms, 31 per-
cent increase in recruitment of rural emergency medicine physicians.
Amarillo lost 26 physicians in the two years preceding the legislation, has
gained 37. The largest malpractice insurance company in the state slashed
its premiums by 35 percent, saving doctors some $217 million over four
years. There are now over 30 companies competing for business.
It's already there. Now, all we have to do is enact this into legislation, and
it's already been proven. So I don't think we have to experiment around.
The two states that have proven that you can enact medical malpractice re-
form and you can act great (ph) savings and provide health care providers
with the incentives they need.
Sen. John McCain on Medical Malpractice Reform at White House Health Summit,
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2010, 5:08 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022504284.html.
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medicine and referred to the tort system as extortionate.' 0 House Mi-
nority Leader John Boehner (R-MI) went even further by identifying
medical liability and defensive medicine as the "biggest cost driver"
of health care cost inflation."
President Obama expressed disagreement with Rep. Boehner's
statement that malpractice was the major driver of health care cost
inflation, noting that while the CBO estimated that enactment of a
federal damages cap could save about $5 billion a year, this savings
was a relatively insignificant amount in a system that spends $2 tril-
lion annually. Nevertheless, he also noted his interest in medical lia-
bility reforms by calling for federal incentives for states "to experi-
ment much more vigorously with ways to reduce frivolous lawsuits, to
pursue settlements, to reduce defensive medicine."l2
Senator Dick Durbin (D-II), who as a practicing attorney had both
defended and sued physicians, offered a rebuttal to the Republican's
arguments for adoption of a damages cap. He noted that while the
CBO found that adoption of a damages cap could save $54 billion
over ten years, it also found that it would reduce accountability and
increase the number of patient deaths by 4,800 each year. He noted
that a cap could result in under-compensation for the most severely
injured victims of malpractice. He further noted that, according to the
Kaiser Foundation, the number of malpractice claims had declined 50
percent nationwide in the past twenty years, and malpractice payouts
had declined from $8 billion to $4 billion from 2003-2008.13 Henry
Waxman also argued that while the California malpractice reforms
had been in place in California since 1975, they had not solved the
problem of health care cost increases, citing the recent attempt by
Anthem to increase premiums for individual policies in California by
39 percent.14
10 Sen. Tom Coburn Discusses Cost Containment at the White House Health
Summit, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2010, 12:03 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022502664.html.
Minority Leader Rep. John Boehner on Individual Mandates at White
House Health Summit, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2010, 5:02 PM), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022504251 .html.
12 Sen. John McCain on Medical Malpractice Reform at White House Health
Summit, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2010, 5:08 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022504284.html.
13 Sen. Dick Durbin on Medical Malpractice Reform at White House Health
Summit, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2010, 5:12 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022504290.html.
14 Rep. Henry Waxman Makes Remarks on Health-Care Costs at White
House Health Summit, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2010, 5:27 PM), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022504333.html.
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Following the bipartisan summit, President Obama announced
that he would incorporate some Republican ideas into his health care
reform proposal. This would include "medical liability reform" in the
form of an additional $50 million for medical liability demonstration
projects. Republican leaders quickly responded that these changes
were cosmetic and would not affect their opposition to the President's
proposal for health care reform.15
While damages caps remain popular with physicians and Republi-
cans in Congress, Baker and others have argued that support for dam-
ages caps is largely based on myth rather than evidence.6 Indeed,
there is a broad consensus among academic researchers that damages
caps do not adequately address the shortcomings of the current medi-
cal liability system with respect to both its deterrence and compensa-
tion goals. While alternative tort reform measures are still largely un-
tested, it is possible that some of these proposals could improve the
medical liability system and make a positive contribution to improv-
ing the health care system.
Part I of this Article looks at the possible impact of health care re-
form on the medical liability system, concluding that while the ACA
could reduce the problem of under-compensation resulting from dam-
ages caps, it could also undermine deterrence by exacerbating the
problem of under-claiming by victims of malpractice and shifting
losses from liability insurers to health insurers. The remainder of the
Article focuses on the potential role of the adoption of federal medical
liability reforms including a damages cap in improving medical liabil-
ity systems and the delivery of health care. Part II discusses state re-
sponses to the medical liability crises and the push for enactment of a
federal damages cap. In Part III we present our study on the relation-
ship between damages caps and premium volatility concluding that
there is greater insurance market stability in states with caps on non-
economic damages. Part IV reviews studies surveying physicians on
the prevalence of defensive medicine. In Part V, we conclude that it is
not clear that federal medical liability reforms including a damages
caps will significantly reduce health care costs or that any savings will
be passed on to consumers. Part VI reviews studies on the impact of
medical liability reform on access suggesting that it could have mod-
est effects in terms of enhancing physician supply, reducing avoidance
behavior by physicians, and increasing access to certain types of care.
In Part VII, we discuss the impact of medical liability reform on pa-
15 Ed Hornick, Obama Says White House Incorporating GOP Ideas into
Health Plan, CNN (Mar. 3, 2010), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/
03/03/health.care.gop.ideas/.
16 See, e.g., TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 1 (2005).
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tient safety, concluding that its effect, if any, on patient safety at the
hospital level is uncertain at this time and that more research in this
area is needed. Finally, Part VIII discusses two promising alternative
medical liability reforms that may be tested in federally-funded
demonstration projects: disclosure and offer and health courts.
I. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF HEALTH CARE
REFORM ON MEDICAL LIABILITY
It is possible that the ACA will have a significant impact on the
medical liability system. If health care reform is effective in reducing
the growth of health care costs, this could have an impact on the level
of damages awards. Baker has identified medical inflation as the most
important factor influencing the rate of growth in loss payouts in med-
ical malpractice cases." Similarly, Chandra et al. (2005) found that
during the period 1991-2003, malpractice payments grew at a rate that
was proportionate to health care spending.18 They also note: "medical
costs, which contribute to the size of compensatory awards, may ex-
plain a sizable portion of payment growth . . . "9 In addition, by
providing guaranteed access to health care insurance at community
rates, the ACA could reduce the problem of under-compensation re-
sulting from damages caps. It could also, however, exacerbate the
problem of under-claiming in the malpractice system, thereby reduc-
ing incentives to invest in loss prevention activities. Moreover, shift-
ing losses from liability insurers to health insurers could further un-
dermine the already weak deterrent effect of the medical liability sys-
tem.
The eventual elimination of medical underwriting in the individu-
al and small group markets by the ACA could reduce the number of
malpractice lawsuits. Beginning in 2014, there is a ban on the use of
pre-existing condition limitations. 20 Guaranteed issuance and renewal
is required.2 1 Moreover, a regime of adjusted community rating will
be imposed on insurers and the only permissible bases for rating are:
age ratio, limited to a ratio of 3:1; rating area; family size; and tobacco
SId at 55.
18 Amitabh Chandra et al., The Growth of Physician Medical Malpractice
Payments: Evidence from the National Practitioner Data Bank, HEALTH AFF., May
2005, at W5-240, W5-243, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w5.240vl.
19 Id. at W5-247
20 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§1201(2)(A), 124 Stat.119, 154 (2010).
21 Id at § 1201(4), 124 Stat. at 156.
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use, limited to a ratio of 1.5:1.22 Even if people are unemployed as a
result of their injuries, they will have access to health insurance at
relatively reasonable rates. Thus, there will always be a source of
payment for future health care costs. This could reduce the propensity
for those with iatrogenic injuries from suspected malpractice to file
lawsuits in order to pay for future health care costs.23 But it may also
exacerbate the problem of under-claiming for negligently-caused inju-
ries that is already a widely acknowledged problem in the current sys-
tem. 24
Moreover, many states have already eliminated or modified the
collateral source rule. Accordingly, a plaintiffs recovery for past
health care costs may be reduced by the amount of payments received
from health insurers and the subrogation rights of health insurers that
have already made payments may be eliminated.25 It is conceivable
that this approach would be extended now that coverage is guaranteed
at adjusted community rates. Future medical cost awards could be
limited to the premium costs for a plan offering sufficient coverage.
The policy question then would be whether or not the health insurer
should be permitted to recover its actual medical costs from the liabil-
ity insurer as they are incurred.
One of the criticisms of caps on non-economic damages is the
likelihood that the cap could result in under-compensation for eco-
nomic damages. This issue would seem less relevant in the era of
health care reform. While caps on non-economic damages do not di-
rectly reduce recovery for future health care costs, caps do reduce the
recovery for pain and suffering which may provide funds for the pay-
ment of the contingency fee. Particularly in high value cases, the im-
position of the cap may result in the possibility that plaintiff will not
have adequate funds available for the payment of future health care
22 Id. at §1201(4), 124 Stat. at 155.
23 Cf Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Injury, Liability and the Decision
to File a Medical Malpractice Claim, 29 L. & Soc'y REV. 413, 426 (1995) (studying
families in Florida that suffered adverse birth outcomes, and finding that families with
health insurance were less likely to file claims).
24 Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Courts?, 88 B.U. L. REv. 227, 229 (2008)
(citing Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 26-27 (2006) (statement
of Michelle Mello)); Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better
for Patients: Hearing of the Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,
109th Cong. 44, 45 (2006) (statement of Philip K. Howard, Founder and Chair,
Common Good; Professor of Law, Columbia Law School)).
25 David Schap & Andrew Feeley, The Collateral Source Rule: Statutory
Reform and Special Interests, 28 CATO J. 83, 89-91 (2008).
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costs. 26 Proponents of caps could now argue that with the ready avail-
ability of health insurance at adjusted community rates, there is less
reason to be concerned that the imposition of a cap would reduce the
availability of funds to cover future economic losses such as health
care costs.
This would be consistent with the approach taken in Canada-a
common law jurisdiction with a fault-based medical malpractice re-
gime and universal access to health care. In 1978, the Supreme Court
of Canada in a trilogy of cases limited non-economic damages in per-
sonal injury cases to $100,000 (CAD). 27 Subsequently, the court held
that the cap should be adjusted for inflation.2 8 An attack on the cap
based on the Charter of Rights was rejected by the British Columbia
Court of Appeals in 2006 and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada denied. 29 Similarly, in England, another fault-based common
law jurisdiction with universal access, while there is not an actual cap,
there are informal guidelines for the amount of damages available for
pain, suffering and loss of amenities that are normally followed.30
Notwithstanding these arguments, however, under the economic
theory of tort law it may not be appropriate to shift the losses caused
by physician negligence to health insurers from medical liability in-
surers. It would undermine the corrective justice aspect of tort law to
require health care insurers rather than liability insurers to make good
on these losses. In addition, the deterrent effect of the medical liability
system is already relatively weak,31 and shifting losses for future
health care costs to health insurers would further weaken it. Awarding
damages for malpractice against negligent health care providers pro-
vides incentives for improvements in patient safety. 32 Thus, deter-
26 See Joni Hersch et al., An Empirical Assessment of Early Offer Reform for
Medical Malpractice, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. s23 1, s233 (2007).
27 Arnold v. Teno, 2 S.C.R. 287 (1978); Thornton v. Prince George School
District No. 57, 2 S.C.R. 267, 284 (1978); Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., 2
S.C.R. 229, 233 (1978).
28 Lindal v. Lindal, 2 S.C.R. 629, 643 (1981).
29 Lee v. Dawson, 50 C.C.L.I. (3d) 212, 17 B.C.L.R. (4th) 80 (2003), aff'd
267 D.L.R. (4th) 138 (B.C.C.A.2006), leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied 361 N.R. 391
(note), 398 W.A.C. 319 (note), 240 B.C.A.C. 319 (note) (2006).
30 Richard Lewis, Increasing the Price of Pain: Damages, The Law Commis-
sion and Heil v. Rankin, 64 MOD. L. REv. 100, 102 (2001).
31 David A. Hyman, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System: What Do We
Know and What (If Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1639, 1644-
47 (2002).
32 Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in
Hospitalized Patients-Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study, 324 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 370, 372 (1991).
2011]1 451
HEAL TH MA TRIX
rence may be better served by retaining the collateral source rule and
allowing subrogation by the health insurer.33
Allowing plaintiffs to recover future health care costs from negli-
gent providers will force medical liability insurers to pass along these
costs to health care providers in the form of higher medical liability
insurance premiums. This in turn should force health care providers to
internalize the costs of their injury-producing activities. This may
provide some additional incentives to concentrate their efforts on im-
proving patient safety, thereby reducing the overall costs of injury. In
addition, allowing plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases to recover
for future health care costs and permitting subrogation by health in-
surers to recover those costs may reduce the costs of health insurance
coverage.
Forcing health insurers rather than liability insurers to bear the
cost of health care for victims of malpractice would also be incon-
sistent with the approach taken by the federal government in enforcing
its rights to repayment of expenses incurred under the Medicare pro-
gram.34 In the case of Medicare beneficiaries, the federal government
has recently taken a more aggressive posture in seeking to recover
payments for the expenses of health care made on behalf of Medicare
beneficiaries from insurers and even attorneys.35
Another way in which health care reform could impact medical li-
ability is through its promotion of comparative effectiveness research
(CER). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 creat-
ed the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness
Research (FCCCER) to coordinate CER across federal agencies and
provided funding for this research.36 In place of the FCCCER, the
ACA creates a private, non-profit entity called the Patient-Centered
Outcomes Research Institute to oversee federal CER and it provides a
permanent funding stream. The expansion of CER could affect the
standards of care for medical treatment, thereby influencing medical
3 Kenneth S. Reinker & David Rosenberg, Unlimited Subrogation: Improv-
ing Medical Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers to Take Charge, 36 J. LEGAL
STUD. S261, S268 (2007).
34 Matthew L. Garretson, Making Sense of Medicare Set-Asides, TRIAL, May
2006, at 64; William L. Winslow, The Uncertain Future of Medicare Set-Asides,
TRIAL, Mar. 2008, at 56.
35 See, e.g., Complaint at 1-2, United States v. Stricker, No. CV-09-PT-2423-
E (N.D. Ala. Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://msacenter.com/FederalGovern-
mentSuesAttorneysforPastMedicare.pdf
36 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §
804, 123 Stat. 115, 187.
3 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§
6301-6302, 124 Stat. 119, 728 (2010).
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liability. There is already a trend toward the replacement of the tradi-
tional customary care standard with a reasonable prudent physician
standard that could rely more on evidence-based medicine.38 The in-
creased emphasis on CER could accelerate this trend by focusing the
attention of courts on what physicians should be doing as established
by the body of CER. On the other hand, it could be argued that physi-
cian fear of malpractice risk and the concomitant defensive practices
will trump the incentives for physicians to provide only evidence-
based care absent enactment of legislation to provide a safe harbor for
physicians who follow evidence-based practice guidelines. 3 9 Thus
safe harbor legislation could be combined with the growing body of
CER to reduce physician fear of malpractice liability.
II. STATE RESPONSES TO MEDICAL LIABILITY
CRISES AND THE PUSH FOR A FEDERAL DAMAGES
CAP
Damages caps have been popular with state legislatures and are
the most prominent and widely debated tort reform measure.40 It is the
only reform that has consistently been shown by empirical studies to
be effective in reducing medical liability insurance premiums. 41 But
while a number of states have enacted damages caps, high courts in
several states have declared damages caps unconstitutional under their
state constitutions.42 Thus, in some instances legislative tort reform
efforts at the state level have been frustrated by state courts and this
has led to calls for a federal damages cap.
The enactment of traditional malpractice reform legislation (in-
cluding damages caps) by state legislatures has typically followed
crises in the insurance market characterized by sudden spikes in rates
and the withdrawal of insurers from the market. There have been three
national liability insurance crises since 1974. The first crisis of the
mid-1970s involved problems with both the affordability and availa-
38 Phillip G. Peters, Jr., Empirical Evidence and Malpractice Litigation, 37
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 757, 757-58 (2002).
39 Tara F. Bishop et al., Physicians' Views on Defensive Medicine: A Nation-
al Survey, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1081 (2010).
40 Lister Hill Center, University of Alabama at Birmingham School of Public
Health, Malpractice Damages Caps Table, http://images.main.uab.edu/isoph/
LHC/DamagesCapsTable.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
41 Leonard J. Nelson, III, Michael A. Morrisey & Meredith L. Kilgore, Dam-
ages Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases, 85 MILBANK Q. 259, 269 (2007).
42 Lister Hill Center, supra note 40.
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bility of malpractice insurance coverage.43 By the late 1970s, the mal-
practice insurance crisis subsided, but by the mid-1980s there was a
crisis of affordability across all lines of third party liability insurance
coverage, including malpractice insurance."A third crisis occurred in
the early 2000s. 45 There was a spike in malpractice insurance premi-
ums, 46 and in December 2001, St. Paul, the largest malpractice insur-
er, stopped writing malpractice insurance. Subsequently, two other
major insurers-PHICO and Frontier Insurance Group-withdrew
from the medical liability insurance market.47 The third crisis had
subsided by 2006.48
There has been substantial disagreement about the causes of the
three malpractice insurance crises. Consumer groups and trial lawyers
have typically blamed investment losses by insurers.4 9 On the other
hand, providers and insurers typically point to increases in loss pay-
outs and litigation costs as the root causes of the crises.50 Recent stud-
ies, however, discount the notion that the crises have been caused by
43 PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 85 (1985); Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insur-
ance "Crisis" of the 1970s: An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
629, 629 (1985).
4 W. Kip Viscusi et al., The Effect of 1980s Tort Reform Legislation on
General Liability and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 165,
171-76 (1993).
45 Michelle M. Mello et al., The New Medical Malpractice Crisis, 348 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2281 (2003).
46 "[Plremiums for all physicians nationwide rose by 15 percent between
2000 and 2002-nearly twice as fast as total health care spending per person." CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF: LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
49xx/doc4968/01-08-MedicalMalpractice.pdf. Increases were even higher for some
specialties: "22 percent for obstetricians/gynecologists and 33 percent for internists
and general surgeons." Id.
47 Patricia A. Danzon et al., The Crisis in Medical Malpractice Insurance, in
BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 55 (Robert E. Litan & Rich-
ard Herring eds., 2004).
48 JOANNE DORSHOW & J. ROBERT HUNTER, INSURANCE "CRISIS" IS OVER-
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES HAVE BEEN STABLE FOR A YEAR 1-2 (2006) (citing to
data from the Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers-Casualty Market Survey),
available at http://www.centerjd.org/air/pr/MMSOFTMARKET.pdf.
49 AM. FOR INS. REFORMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: STABLE
LOSSES/UNSTABLE RATES 7 (2002), available at http://www.centerjd.org/
air/StableLosses.pdf.
5o ROBERT P. HARTWIG & CLAIRE WILKINSON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE 4-5 (2003), available at http://www.yourhealthmattersagents.com/
pdfs/resources/Insurancelnfolnsti-MalpracticeReport.pdf; AM. MED. Ass'N, MEDICAL
LIABILITY REFORM-NOW!: A COMPENDIUM OF FACTS SUPPORTING MEDICAL
LIABILITY REFORM AND DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS AGAINST REFORM 3-5 (2008),
http://www.ama-assn.org/amal /pub/upload/mm/-I/mlmow.pdf.
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spikes in loss payouts. Baker rejects increased loss payouts as the
cause and instead focused on the insurance underwriting cycle." He
notes that insurers have periodically underestimated losses until actual
loss experience has provoked a reaction from firms that have then
overestimated predicted losses and increased reserves.52 This problem
has been exacerbated by the time lag between the writing of coverage
and the reporting of actual losses. But there is also some evidence
that investment returns, in part, influence malpractice insurance pre-
miums. Kilgore and colleagues (2006) found that, controlling for oth-
er factors, a 1% increase in the Dow Jones Industrial Average was
associated with a 0.4% reduction in malpractice premiums.5 4
The malpractice crisis of the mid-1970s resulted in significant
state legislative activity beginning in 1975.'" Several states responded
by passing medical liability reform legislation.56 The most popular
reforms enacted during the 1970s included: damages caps, mandatory
screening panels, tightened up statute of limitations, restrictions on ad
damnum clauses, collateral source rule modification or abrogation,
restrictions on contingency fees, and clarification or limitation of the
doctrine of informed consent.57 In order to address the lack of availa-
bility of coverage, some states created joint underwriting associations,
58 and physician mutual insurers. 59 A few states created patient com-
pensation funds (PCFs) that were combined with caps on provider
liability and total damages. 60 In addition, physician mutual insurers
were formed in many states.61
51 BAKER, supra note 16, at 51-58
52 Id. at 53-54.
53 Id. at 52-53.
54 Meredith L. Kilgore, Michael A. Morrisey & Leonard J. Nelson, Tort Law
and Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 43 INQUIRY 255, 264 (2006).
5 Steven A. Grossman, An Analysis of 1975 Legislation Relating to Medical
Malpractice, in A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 3 (Da-
vid Warren & Richard Merritt eds., 1976).
56 Sloan, supra note 43.
5 See Grossman, supra note 55, at 8-10.
58 Id. at 4. "Joint underwriting associations (JUAs) serve as residual market
mechanisms for physicians who are unable to obtain coverage in the voluntary mar-
ket." Danzon et al., supra note 47, at 56. Typically, insurers are required to participate
in the medical JUA as a condition of writing other lines of insurance in the state.
JUAs in many states provide "a cross-subsidy to physicians" by shifting their losses
either to policy holders "in other personal lines" or allowing a tax write off for losses
to insurers. DANZON, supra note 43, at 112.
59 Grossman, supra note 55, at 6.
60 See e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (West 2010); LA. REV. ST. ANN. §§
40:1299.42, 1299:44 (2008 & Supp. 2011).
61 James R. Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 1970-1985,
49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 39 (1986).
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In 1975, California enacted the Medical Injury Compensation Re-
form Act (MICRA), a package of bills that has become the "gold
standard" 62 for proponents of malpractice reform. MICRA capped
non-economic damages at $250,000 with no adjustment for infla-
tion. Other MICRA provisions included collateral source offset,M
periodic payout of future damages, limits on the contingency fees
that may be charged by plaintiffs attorney, 66 a statute of repose, 6 7
mandatory advance notice of a claim, 68 and binding arbitration. 6 9 At
62 Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children,
and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1282-83 (2004).
63 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 2011). Damages in a malpractice ac-
tion may include compensatory and punitive elements. Compensatory damages (com-
pensation for losses) include both economic (e.g., lost earnings and medical expenses)
and non-economic components (e.g., pain and suffering). DANZON, supra note 43, at
34.
6 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West 2011). At common law, plaintiffs were
permitted to recover damages even though the plaintiff has been reimbursed for those
damages by a collateral source unrelated to the defendant. For example, a plaintiff
could recover for medical expenses even if those expenses were covered by plaintiff's
health insurer. The California statute modifies this common law rule by permitting the
defendant to introduce evidence that the plaintiff was reimbursed for expenses by a
collateral source. Id. Since the mid- 1 970s many jurisdictions have adopted statutes
requiring the judge to offset the moneys from the collateral source or permitting evi-
dence of reimbursement to be presented to the jury with evidence of the payment of
premiums by the plaintiff. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice:
Further Developments and a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 499,
526 (1989).
65 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 2011). At common law, plaintiffs
were entitled to receive a damages award as a lump sum including past damages and
future damages discounted to present value. The California statute modifies this
common law rule by mandating, upon the request of any party, the periodic payout of
future damages that exceed $50,000. Under this law these future damages are to be
paid out as they accrue. Id. Since the mid-1970s, several jurisdictions have passed
statutes mandating or permitting periodic payout. Bovbjerg, supra note 64, at 527.
66 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2010). This statute was adopted in
1975 and amended in 1987. Its current version provides for limits of 40% of the first
$50,000 recovered; 33% and 1/3 of the next $50,000; 25% of the next $500,000, and
15% of any amount exceeding $600,000. Id. Since the mid-1970s, a number of juris-
dictions have passed statutes imposing specific percentage limitations or providing for
reasonableness review. Bovbj erg, supra note 64, at 522-23.
67 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 2011). A statute of repose places an
absolute time limit on when an action must be filed regardless of whether plaintiff has
discovered the injury. The California statute has a one year discovery rule coupled
with a three year statute of repose than runs from the date of the injury with certain
exceptions including fraud, intentional concealment, and presence of a foreign body
with no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose in the plaintiffs body. Id. Several states
have adopted this type of legislation typically with a three or four year statute of
repose. Bovbjerg, supra note 64, at 524.
68 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 364 (West 2011) requires ninety days advance
notice of intent to file a medical malpractice claim.
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the time of its enactment MICRA was relatively uncontroversial.
Governor Jerry Brown, a Democrat, had called a special session of the
legislature to deal with a perceived insurance crisis that had triggered
a doctor's strike in Northern California. 70 The legislation enacted en-
joyed bi-partisan support: most of the reforms were recommended by
a committee chaired by Democrat Henry Waxman, then a member of
the California Assembly, and embraced by Governor Brown.7 ' Subse-
quently, the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
these reforms. 72
Other states also passed reforms during this period. For example,
in 1975, Indiana 73 and Louisiana 74 adopted overall caps on damages
coupled with a lower provider cap. To benefit from the cap, providers
were required to obtain coverage up to the level of the provider cap or
post a bond. Patient compensation funds were created in both states
to provide insurance to cover the gap between the overall cap and the
lower provider cap.76 The constitutionality of the Louisiana77 and In-
diana7 ' damages caps were subsequently upheld by their respective
state supreme courts.
Some damages cap passed during this era were declared unconsti-
tutional by state courts. For example, in 1975, Illinois passed a pack-
age of reforms including an overall cap on damages in medical mal-
69 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 2011) provides for the enforcement
of pre-claim agreements to arbitrate that follow a specified format. Beginning in the
mid-1970s, several states passed legislation endorsing voluntary pre-claim agree-
ments to arbitrate. This legislation sometimes imposes special requirements to ensure
that the plaintiff is aware that the right to jury trial is being given up. Bovbjerg, supra
note 64, at 522; see also Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728 (Ct. App.
2009) (refusing to compel arbitration holding that health care provider could not
establish that minor patient voluntarily waived right to jury trial where she died with-
in statutory revocation period).
70 Assessing the Need to Enact Medical Liability Reform: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce H.R., 108th Cong. 44
(2003) (testimony of Fred J. Hiestand, CEO and General Counsel, Californians Allied
for Patient Protection).
" Id. at 45.
72 Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 695 P.2d 665 (Cal.1985) (upholding con-
stitutionality of damages caps and collateral source rule); Roa v. Lodi Med. Grp., 695
P.2d 164 (Cal. 1985) (upholding limits on contingency fees).
73 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (West 2010).
74 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B) (2008 & Supp. 2011).
7 Id. § 40:1299.42(A)(1).
76 See id. § 40:1299.42(B)(3)(a).
n Williams v. Kushner, 549 So. 2d 294 (La. 1989) (upholding cap of
$400,000 on liability of PCF but further holding that differential treatment of claims
filed before September 1, 1984, violated equal protection, and declining to decide
validity of $100,000 cap on provider liability).
78 Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980).
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practice cases of $500,000 that was subsequently declared unconstitu-
tional. 7 9 Similarly, caps on non-economic damages in malpractice
cases enacted in Ohio (1975) and New Hampshire (1977) were later
declared unconstitutional.so
The mid-1980s crisis affected all lines of insurance, and many
states passed tort reform legislation that applied to all types of person-
al injury claims." Tort reform measures were adopted in forty-one
states in 1986.82 Many of the same tort reform measures were adopted
in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., damages caps, collateral source offset,
periodic payout, etc.), but in the latter decade many of these reforms
were applicable more generally to personal injury actions rather than
being limited to medical liability actions. 83 But some states adopted
caps specific to medical malpractice in the mid-1980s that were de-
clared unconstitutional. For example, in 1986, the State of Washing-
ton adopted a cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice
actions that was subsequently declared unconstitutional. 84 In 1987
Alabama passed medical malpractice reforms including cap on non-
economic damages in malpractice cases and an overall cap on damag-
es in wrongful death malpractice cases that were subsequently de-
clared unconstitutional by the state supreme court.
79 Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill. 1976)
(declaring cap of $500,000 found in Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, par. 101 unconstitutional
under Illinois constitutional provision prohibiting special laws).
s0 Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 768, 772 (Ohio 1991) (declaring cap
found in Ohio Revised Code § 2307.43 unconstitutional as violative of Ohio Constitu-
tion due process provision); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 839 (N.H. 1980) (hold-
ing entire malpractice reform act unconstitutional including $250,000 cap non-
economic damages found in RSA 507-C:7), overruled by Cmty. Res. for Justice, Inc.
v. City of Manchester, 154 N.H. 748, 917 A.2d 707, 721 (N.H. 2007) (articulating
new intermediate scrutiny standard and overruling Carson's articulation of intermedi-
ate scrutiny test).
s1 Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Tort Reforms on the Value of Closed Med-
ical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysis, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 663, 663-
64(1989).
82 Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, The Effect of State Tort Reform
Legislation on Liability Insurance Losses and Premiums 1 (June 7, 1990) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School
ofGovernment).
83 Bovbjerg, supra note 64, at 538-39.
84 Sofie v. Fireboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 728 (Wash. 1989) (declaring
Washington Revised Code § 4.56.250 unconstitutional under right to jury trial provi-
sions of Washington Constitution).
8s Smith v. Schulte, 671 So.2d 1334, 1344 (Ala. 1995) (declaring overall cap
on wrongful death damages found in Ala. Code § 6-5-547 unconstitutional); Ray v.
Anesthesia Assoc., 674 SO.2d 525, 526 (Ala. 1995) (declaring cap on wrongful death
damages found in Alabama Code § 6-5-547 unconstitutional); Moore v. Mobile In-
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A few states passed reform legislation that included damages caps
in the mid-1990s despite the lack of a current crisis. For example, in
the mid-1990s, the legislatures in both Illinois (1995) and Ohio (1996)
attempted to impose caps in all personal injury actions after their re-
spective state supreme courts had struck down caps in medical mal-
practice action, but both caps were subsequently struck down. 86
During the most recent malpractice crisis, the AMA identified
eighteen states that were experiencing a crisis in medical liability in-
surance affordability and availability.8 7 Several states passed tradi-
tional malpractice reform measures in the 2000s,88 but some of these
measures have already been declared unconstitutional. In 2005, the
Illinois legislature again imposed a damages cap. This time it had a
limit of $500,000 for individual defendants and $1 million for institu-
tional defendants in malpractice actions, but this statute was declared
unconstitutional by the state supreme court in 2010.89 In 2005, the
Georgia legislature passed a $350,000 cap on non-economic damages
in medical malpractice cases, but in 2010 the Supreme Court of Geor-
gia invalidated this cap because it violated a state constitutional right
to trial by jury. 90
Other caps have fared better. In 2002, the Ohio legislature again
imposed a cap in medical malpractice actions. 91 The Supreme Court
of Ohio has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of this statute, but it
did uphold a similar cap applicable in product liability and asbestos
actions.92 In 2003, Texas adopted a damages cap on non-economic
damages of $250,000 per claimant in actions brought against physi-
firmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991) (declaring cap on non-economic damages
found in Alabama Code § 6-5-544 unconstitutional).
86 Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1063-64 (Ill. 1997) (de-
claring cap of $500,000 on non-economic damages in all personal injury actions
found in 735 Illinois Compiled Statutes § 5/2-1115.1 unconstitutional); State ex rel.
Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1092, 1111 (Ohio 1999)
(declaring cap of $250,000 or three times economic damages to a maximum of
$500,000 with a higher cap for cases of permanent injuries found in Ohio Revised
Code § 2323.54 unconstitutional).
87 Mello et al., supra note 45, at 2282.
88 William N. Sage, Understanding the First Malpractice Crisis of the 21st
Century, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 1, 29 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2001).
Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'1 Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 912 (Ill. 2010) (holding
cap found in 735 Illinois Compiled Statutes § 2-1706.5 unconstitutional as violative
of separation of powers provision in state constitution).
90 Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 220 (Ga.
2010) (holding cap found in Georgia Code § 51-13-1 unconstitutional under right to
jury trial provision in state constitution).
9' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43(A) (West 2010).
92 Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio 2007).
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cians 93 after a constitutional amendment was passed by the vote of the
people to insulate the cap against constitutional challenge. 94 The con-
stitutional amendment was deemed necessary because the Texas Su-
preme court had held that an earlier cap violated the Texas Constitu-
tion.9 ' In 2009, Oklahoma adopted a cap of $400,000 on non-
economic damages applicable in all personal injury cases. 96 These
limits do not apply in certain malpractice actions where the jury finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff suffered serious
bodily injury, or that the harm was inflicted through grossly negligent,
reckless, fraudulent, intentional or malicious acts. 9 7
Advocates of tort reform have been frustrated by the actions of
state high courts and have focused their efforts on the enactment of a
federal cap on damages. A federal cap would neither be subject to
challenge under state constitutions nor vulnerable to federal constitu-
tional challenges under existing precedents. 98 During the early 2000s,
President George W. Bush, Republicans in Congress, the AMA, and
several other physician groups supported the Help Efficient, Accessi-
ble, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare Act (HEALTH Act).99 This pro-
posed legislation was patterned after MICRA and included a $250,000
cap on non-economic damages.100 The House passed the HEALTH
Act three years in a row (2003, 2004, 2005), but the legislation never
made it through the Senate.' 01
In 2003, Donald Palmisano, then President of the American Med-
ical Association and a physician from Louisiana with a law degree,
testified before Congress calling for the enactment of federal legisla-
tion patterned after MICRA including a $250,000 cap on non-
9 TEX Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.301 (West 2011).
94 TEX. CONST. ANN., Art. 3, § 66 (West 2011).
9 Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
96 23 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.2(B) (West 2010).
9 Id. at § 61.2(C).
98 See e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1195-96 (4th Cir. 1989) (uphold-
ing Virginia cap and rejecting federal due process, equal protection, separation of
powers, and right to jury trial arguments); Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 423
(5th Cir. 1986) (holding Texas damages cap does not violate federal equal protection
clause).
9 Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act
of 2007, H.R. 2580, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted); Press Release, Congressman Phil
Gingrey Introduces Medical Liability Reform Legislation (June 6, 2007), available at
http://gingrey.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=66912.
100 H.R. 5, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003).
'o' Medical Liability Bill Passes House for Third Year in a Row: Inaction by
Senate Stalls Pain and Suffering Award Caps, MED. & HEALTH, Aug. 8, 2005, at X.
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economic damages. 102 He testified that this legislation was necessary
because many physicians could either no longer find or were unable to
afford liability insurance and thus were closing their practices, retiring
or reducing services. 1o3
In his testimony, Doctor Palmisano referred to two reports pre-
pared by the United States Department of Health and Human Services
in support of his claim that states with caps on non-economic damages
had experienced only moderate increases in rates while states without
such caps had experienced much larger increases.' 04 He argued that
federal MICRA-style reforms were necessary because state courts had
struck down many reforms as unconstitutional. He contended that the
adoption of MICRA was responsible for keeping premium increases
on medical liability insurance in California at moderate levels. And he
urged congressional passage of legislation patterned after MICRA
because of its effectiveness "especially at controlling non-economic
damages." os
Physician specialty associations have also called for the adoption
of MICRA-style reforms at the federal level. The American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) claims that one in ten
obstetricians and several hospitals have stopped delivering babies and
cesarean sections have increased because of the cost of malpractice
insurance. 10 6 During the malpractice crisis of the early 2000s, the
President of ACOG identified nine crisis states (FL, MS, NV, NJ, NY,
PA, TX, WA, WV) where obstetricians were being forced to stop
delivering babies because of unavailable or unaffordable malpractice
insurance, and called for enactment of a federal damages cap as an
appropriate remedy.1 07 Similarly, in 2003, the American College of
Surgeons (ACS) endorsed the HEALTH Act, legislation that would
102 Assessing the Need for Medical Liability Reform: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 120-28
(2003) [hereinafter Palmisano Statement] (statement of Donald J. Palmisano, Presi-
dent, American Medical Association).
103 Id. at 122.
" Id. at 122-23 (referring to U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY
AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM (2002), available
at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., SPECIAL UPDATE ON THE MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS (2002), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/mlupdl.htm.
05 Palmisano Statement, supra note 101, at 127.
106 Philip K. Howard, Why Medical Malpractice Is Off Limits, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 29, 2009, at A25.
107 OB-GYNs: Insurance Costs Could Provoke Crisis, ENQUIRER (May 2,
2002), http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2002/05/06/fin ob-gynsinsurance.html.
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impose a federal cap of $250,000 on non-economic damages in mal-
practice cases. os
III. PREMIUM VOLATILITY AND DAMAGES CAPS
The American Medical Association (AMA) supported the ACA
even though the legislation did not include traditional medical liability
reforms. 109 But during the recent health care reform debate, physician
groups contended that significant cost savings, quality improvements,
and increased access could come from the federal adoption of tradi-
tional reforms including damages caps. 110 Physician groups have tra-
ditionally identified tort reform as a policy priority and damages cap
as the most important reform. A 2007 position paper issued by the
AMA noted that "MICRA's $250,000 cap on non-economic damages
has been the cornerstone of organized medicine's attempts to ensure a
litigation system that does not hinder patient access to care."' Physi-
cian support for damages caps could be explained by concerns about
the insurance cycle and the consequent instability of the market. Our
own study presented here suggests that there is greater insurance mar-
ket stability in states with caps on non-economic damages.
The enthusiastic support by physicians for damages caps is
somewhat of a mystery. Since most physicians have insurance cover-
age that provides indemnification and the costs of defending claims,
out-of-pocket costs are limited. 1 12 Furthermore, medical liability in-
surance is not experience-rated so a claim does not result in an in-
crease in premiums for the physician that is sued." 3 Moreover,
Thurston found that physicians are able to pass along medical liability
insurance premium increases to third party payers.114 More recently, a
"os The Medical Liability Crisis: A Federal Problem that Requires a Federal
Solution, Am. COLL. OF SURGEONS (July 8, 2003), http://www.facs.org/ahp/
fedproblem.html.
109 Press Release, Am. Med. Ass'n., AMA Supports Passages of Health Sys-
tem Reform (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.ama-assn.org/amalpub/health-system-
reform/ama-supports-reform-passage.shtml.
110 Letter from Several Specialty Societies to Henry Waxman, Chairman
Comm. of Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Rep. 1 (July 6, 2009), available at
http://www.acponline.org/advocacy/where we stand/liability/waxman7-09.pdf.
"1 AM. MED. Ass'N, HEALTH COURTS 1 (2007), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/378/healthcrtprinciples.pdf
112 Robert Quinn, Medical Malpractice Insurance: The Reputation Effect and
Defensive Medicine, 65 J. RISK & INS. 467, 468 (1998).
113 MICHELLE M. MELLO, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE: A PRIMER 1 (2006), http://www.rwjf.org/pr/synthesis/reports_and_
briefs/pdf/no I _primer.pdf.
114 Norman K. Thurston, Physician Market Power-Evidence from the Alloca-
tion of Market Malpractice Premiums, 39 ECON. INQUIRY 487, 497 (2001).
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study by Pauly et al. (2006) found that increased medical liability in-
surance premiums did not reduce physician incomes, thereby support-
ing the notion that physicians are able to pass along those costs to
employers, health insurers and consumers.' 5 And one study found
that physician incomes actually increased during the malpractice crisis
of the 1980s. 116
Nonetheless, there are now several studies showing that caps ei-
ther reduce medical liability insurance premiums, or slow the rate of
increase in medical liability insurance premiums." 7 Thus, caps under
some circumstances could reduce physician costs by reducing the cost
of medical liability insurance. Where prices of medical services do not
adjust to these changes or demand is sufficiently elastic, physician
incomes could increase. 118
In addition to malpractice insurance premiums and the stress that
arises while defending a lawsuit,ll 9 physicians are also concerned
about the effect of malpractice lawsuits on their reputations.120 This
problem has undoubtedly been exacerbated by the requirement that
judgments against and settlements on behalf of physicians be reported
to the National Practitioner Data Bank. 121 Lawthers et al. (1992)
found that physicians over-predict their likelihood of being sued.122
Thus it may be legitimate for them to focus on reforms that indirectly
reduce the number of claims by reducing the levels of recovery for
115 Mark Pauly et al., Who Pays? The Incidence of High Malpractice Premi-
ums, 9 F. HEALTH ECON. & POL'Y, 2006 at 1, 8.
116 Stephen L. Fielding, The Social Construction of the Medical Malpractice
Crisis: A Case Study of Massachusetts Physicians, 5 Soc. F. 279, 287 (1990).
117 Nelson, Morrisey & Kilgore, supra note 41.
118 David A. Matsa, Does Malpractice Liability Keep the Doctor Away? Evi-
dence from Tort Reform Damage Caps, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 144 (2007).
119 Peters, supra note 24, at 256-57 (citing Sara C. Charles et al., Sued and
Nonsued Physicians' Self-Reported Reactions to Malpractice Litigation, 142 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 437, 438 (1985)).
120 W.M. Sage, Reputation, Malpractice Liability, and Medical Error, in
ACCOUNTABILITY: PATIENT SAFETY AND POLICY REFORM 159, 160 (Virginia A.
Sharpe ed., 2004).
121 Peters, supra note 24, at 256 (citing Teresa M. Waters et al., Impact of the
National Practitioner Data Bank on Resolution of Malpractice Claims, 40 INQUIRY
283, 283 (2003)). Physicians are concerned about reports to the National Practitioner
Data Bank because hospitals are required to query it about malpractice payments for
new applicants for staff privileges and on a periodic basis for existing members of the
medical staff. Laura-Mae Baldwin et al., Hospital Peer Review and the National
Practitioner Data Bank, 281 JAMA 349, 349 (1999).
122 Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physicians' Perceptions of the Risk of Being Sued,
17 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 463, 473-74 (1992).
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claimants.12 3 In this regard, there is evidence of a slight reduction in
claim frequency due to direct reforms such as damages caps.124 And
Waters et al. (2007) found that caps on non-economic damages were
associated with fewer paid claims and lower per physician pay-
ments. 125
Physicians may also be more concerned about sudden spikes in
premiums and volatility in the medical liability insurance market than
they are about continuous moderate increases in premium levels over
time. This attitude would be consistent with the ability to pass on
higher malpractice insurance premiums, but only with a time lag be-
tween the increase in rates and the pass through of these costs. If so,
physicians would suffer income losses until the higher premium costs
are reflected in higher charges to payers. In this regard, it appears that
a damages cap coupled with creation of a state patient compensation
fund may be an effective means of reducing volatility in the medical
liability insurance market even if it is not effective in reducing claim
frequency and overall loss payouts.
In a comparative study of the medical liability systems in Ala-
bama, Louisiana and Mississippi, Nelson et al. (2008) found that med-
ical liability insurance premium levels in Louisiana, a jurisdiction
with a patient compensation fund and damages caps, were substantial-
ly higher than in Alabama, and that Louisiana had a more plaintiff-
friendly malpractice environment in terms of the total value of paid
claims and the number of paid claims than either Alabama or Missis-
sippi. Nonetheless, the study concluded that Louisiana had established
a stable medical liability insurance system that was generally support-
ed by providers and insurers.126
While premiums in Louisiana were substantially higher than those
in Alabama, and comparable to those in Mississippi, they were not as
volatile. 127 During the period examined (1991-2004), Louisiana had a
damages cap in place.' 28 Alabama had caps that were passed in 1987,
but they were held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Alabama
123 Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform
and Birth Outcomes, 123 Q. J. EcoN. 795, 799 (2008).
124 Daniel P. Kessler & Mark. B. McClellan, The Effects of Malpractice Pres-
sure and Liability Reforms on Physicians' Perceptions of Medical Care, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (1997).
125 Teresa M. Waters et al., Impact of State Tort Reforms on Physician Mal-
practice Payments, 26 HEALTH AFF. 500, 504 (2007).
126 Leonard J. Nelson, III, Michael A. Morrisey & Meredith L. Kilgore, Medi-
cal Malpractice Reform in Three Southern States, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 69,
151 (2008).
127 Id. at 147-48.
128 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B) (2008 & Supp. 2011).
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in 1991 (non-economic damages) 129 and 1995 (wrongful death). 130 Mis-
sissippi did not have a cap on non-economic damages until 2002, ' and
that was passed in response to a spike in premium levels.132
The continuing support of physicians for the Louisiana malprac-
tice system suggests that physicians may be more concerned with the
stability of premium levels than with the actual cost of premiums. The
most significant components of the Louisiana malpractice reforms are
the caps on damages and the Louisiana Patient Compensation Fund
(LPCF). The Louisiana cap limits the liability of "qualified health care
providers" for injuries resulting from malpractice to $100,000.133
Health care providers may become "qualified" by filing proof that
they are covered by a policy of malpractice liability insurance in an
amount of at least $100,000 per claim, or if self-insured, depositing
$125,000 with the fund or otherwise arranging for a letter of credit or
other security. 134 "Qualified health care providers" must also pay a
surcharge assessed by the Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission.' 35
Damages recoverable in malpractice actions against "qualified
health care providers" are capped at a total of $500,000 plus interest
and costs, 136 with the liability of the individual health provider being
capped at $100,000.137 These caps were set in 1975 and have not been
increased for inflation. In 1984, however, the statute was amended to
exclude future health care expenses. 138 Thus plaintiffs are now entitled
to recover for future health care costs without regard to the cap.
The damages available to a successful plaintiff in an action
against a "qualified health care provider" are paid both by the provid-
er's insurer and the LPCF. No "qualified health care provider" can be
held liable for more than $100,000 plus interest.' 39 Thus, any judg-
ment in excess of the total liability for qualified health care providers
of $100,000 is to be paid out of the LPCF. 140 Future medical costs,
which are not subject to the $500,000 cap, are also to be paid out of
129 Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991) (holding
cap in Alabama Code § 6-5-544 unconstitutional).
130 Smith v. Schulte, 671 So.2d 1334, 1344 (Ala. 1995) (holding cap in Ala-
bama Code § 6-5-547 unconstitutional); Ray v. Anesthesia Assocs., 674 So.2d 525,
526 (Ala. 1995) (same).
131 MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60 (West 2010).
132 Nelson, Morrisey & Kilgore, supra note 126, at 117.
'33 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B) (2008 & Supp. 2011).
134 Id. § 40:1299.42(A)(1).
115 Id. § 40:1299.42(A)(2); Id. § 40:1299.44(2)(A).
136 Id. §40:1299.42(B)(1).
137 Id. §40:1299.42(B)(2).
"3 1984 La. Acts 1056.
139 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B)(2) (2008 & Supp. 2011).
140 Id. § 40:1299.42(B)(3)(a).
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the LPCF.141 Louisiana does not recognize punitive damages as an
available common law remedy. 142
Arguably, it is the low cap on provider's liability and the cap on to-
tal damages coupled with the LPCF that has led to a relatively stable
medical liability insurance market in Louisiana. Sloan et al. (2005) not-
ed that one of the main motivations in creating patient compensation
funds was "providing physicians and hospitals with affordable and reli-
able medical malpractice insurance coverage by covering losses at the
higher end of the distribution of losses, thereby reducing volatility...
,143 Based on a qualitative evaluation, they found that properly de-
signed patient compensation funds may be an effective means of reduc-
ing volatility and combating periodic insurance crises. 44
It is generally assumed that there is a strong link between the con-
ditions in the medical liability insurance market and physician support
of damages caps. It is not, however, clear whether this support for
damages caps is more a function of higher absolute premium levels,
concern about the probability of lawsuits, or premium volatility. Con-
cems about premium volatility could explain physician support for
damages caps. Baker has attributed most of the volatility in the medi-
cal liability insurance market to an underwriting cycle in which insur-
ers periodically underestimate potential losses until actual losses force
them to raise their premium rates. 145A time lag between a sudden
spike in medical liability insurance premium levels and the ability of
physicians to pass on those increased costs could energize physicians
to support the enactment of damages caps in the belief that this will
reduce market volatility and return stability to the system. If this sud-
den spike is accompanied by the exit of insurers from the market, then
141 Id. § 40:1299.42(B)(1). The cap on Patient Compensation Fund liability
established by § 40:1299.42(B) excludes from its scope "future medical care and
related benefits" as provided in § 40:40:1299.43. Under § 40:1299.43, if a court de-
termines that a claimant is in need of "future medical care and related benefits," de-
fined as "all reasonable medical, surgical, hospitalization, physical rehabilitation, and
custodial services and includes drugs, prosthetic devices, and other similar materials
reasonably necessary in the provision of such services, after the date of the injury,"
then damages are recoverable from the Patient Compensation without regard to the
cap. In addition, the legislature is supposed to appropriate sufficient monies to pay
claims in excess of the $500,000 limit for future medical care.
142 Louis Guirola & Thomas L. Carpenter, Jr., Punitive Damages in Missis-
sippi: What Has Happened;, What is Happening and What is Coming Next, 73 Miss.
L.J. 135, 137 & n.11 (2003).
143 Frank A. Sloan et al., Public Medical Malpractice Insurance: An Analysis
ofState-Operated Patient Compensation Funds, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 247, 250 (2005).
1 Id. at 271.
145 BAKER, supra note 16, at 51-58.
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physician support for damages caps would be tied to the malpractice
insurance underwriting cycle.
There is a dearth of empirical studies establishing that damages
caps have been effective in taming the volatility of the insurance un-
derwriting cycle, but there are studies finding that caps reduce losses
by insurers. Using financial data from the National Association of
Insurance Commissioner files for medical liability insurers (1984-
1991), Born and Viscusi (2005) found that caps on non-economic
damages reduced insurers' loss ratios and incurred losses.1 46 Focusing
on loss ratios-the ratio of losses incurred to premiums earned-they
found that the enactment of reforms typically follow a surge in loss
ratios.14 7 And they found that caps on non-economic damages in-
creased insurer profitability by reducing loss ratios 10 to 13 per-
cent.14 8 Born et al. (2010) found that caps on non-economic damages
reduced insurer's ultimate losses and increased insurer's income.14 9
On the other hand, it does not appear that the medical malpractice
crises of the mid-1980s and the 2000s resulted from sudden spikes in
loss payouts.150 Indeed, Chandra et al. (2005) concluded that medical
liability loss payouts (judgments and settlements) had "not risen sig-
nificantly" from 1991 to 2003 when viewed "as a fraction of national
health care spending."' 5 ' They found the increase in loss payouts dur-
ing this period could largely be explained by increased medical costs,
and concluded there was only a weak relationship between loss pay-
outs and increased medical liability insurance premiums.152 And a
study of closed claims in Texas by Black et al. (2005) concluded that
the medical liability insurance crisis in that jurisdiction was not
caused by a spike in loss payouts.'53 They concluded that malpractice
reforms will probably not prevent future crises.15 4
Nonetheless, supporters of damages caps point to success in Cali-
fornia as a basis for their support of damages caps. The AMA touts
the relative stability of the California insurance market since the en-
146 W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia H. Born, Damages Caps, Insurability, and the
Performance ofMedical Malpractice Insurance, 72 J. RISK & INS. 23, 25-26 (2005).
147 Id. at 28.
148 Id. at 38-39.
149 Patricia Born et al., The Effects of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice
Insurer's Ultimate Losses, 76 J. RISK & INS. 197, 216 (2009).
150 BAKER, supra note 16, at 51.
'' Chandra et al., supra note 18, at W5-247.
152 id.
'53 Bernard Blacket al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim
Outcomes in Texas, 1998-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 210 (2005).
154 Id
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actment of MICRA in 1975 as proof of the efficacy of caps.' But
according to opponents of caps, this stability has resulted not from
MICRA, but from the passage of Proposition 103 in 1988, a measure
that included a rollback on premiums, and a mechanism for consum-
ers to challenge rate increases.156 Nonetheless, it is clear that the
MICRA cap has resulted in reductions in damage awards. Rand
(2004) found that from 1995-1999 California jury verdict awards in
malpractice cases were reduced 30 percent due to the imposition of
the MICRA cap, with the cap being imposed in 45% of the cases re-
viewed. 157
Rand (2004) also found that as a result of MICRA's limits on con-
tingency fees, MICRA reduced plaintiff's attorney fees by 60%. 158
Indeed, these limits reduced incentives for attorneys to bring malprac-
tice claims, which in turn could have reduced the number of claims
filed. From 2003-2008, the total number of annual paid claims in Cal-
ifornia declined from 1,312 to 901."9 It is not clear, however, that the
decline in the number of claims is due to the effect of MICRA. For
example, it could be due to improvements in patient safety. Using
California physician malpractice claims and patient safety data from
2001-2005, Rand (2010) found a correlation between a reduction in
potential adverse patient safety incidents and fewer malpractice claims
at the county level.1 6 0 The study noted that since MICRA had been in
place since the mid-1970s, the decline in claims could not be ex-
plained by "the impact of tort reform within the state."16 1 Nonetheless,
since the California damages cap has no inflation factor and has not
been increased since its adoption in 1975, it becomes more stringent
155 AM. MED. Ass'N, MED. LIABILITY REFORM: Q&A (2006), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/399/mlrtp.pdf.
156 Found. for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, How Insurance Reform Low-
ered Doctors' Medical Malpractice Rates in California and How Malpractice Caps
Failed, CONSUMERWATCHDOG.ORG (Mar. 7, 2003), http://www.consumer
watchdog.org/resources/1 008.pdf
157 NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., CAPPING NON-ECONOMic AWARDS IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS UNDER MICRA 47 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RANDMG234.pdf.
' Id. at 48.
159 Kaiser Family Found., Number of Paid Medical Malpractice Claims,
STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetrend.jsp?yr-63&sub=1 02&cat-8&ind-436
&typ=l &srgn=6 (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
160 MICHAEL D. GREENBERG ET AL., Is BETTER PATIENT SAFETY ASSOCIATED
WITH LESS MALPRACTICE ACTIvITY? 11 (2010), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technicalreports/2010/RANDTR824.pdf.
161 Id. at 5.
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over time.162 This ratcheting down effect could provide at least a par-
tial explanation for the continuing decrease in the number of claims.
Proponents of damages caps also point to Texas as an example of
the success of caps in stabilizing the medical liability insurance mar-
ket. In 2003, the Texas legislature capped non-economic damages in
medical malpractice actions at $250,000 in actions against individual
physicians, with an aggregate cap of up to $500,000 per claimant in
actions involving more than one institutional provider.163 In 2005,
several Texas medical liability insurers announced rate cuts for
2006.164 For several of these companies, this was the second round of
rate cuts following enactment of the damages cap.' 65 Hyman, Black,
Silver and Sage (2009) found that the Texas caps significantly re-
duced verdicts, payouts and settlements.166 And from 2003 to 2008,
the total number of annual paid claims in Texas plunged from 1,067 to
464.167
Table 1 provides some initial evidence that the presence of dam-
age caps on non-economic damages is associated with greater premi-
um stability. Data on malpractice insurance premiums for internal
medicine, general surgery, and obstetrics/gynecology by state were
obtained from the Medical Liability Monitor for the period 1991
through 2004. During this period nineteen states had damage caps in
place for the entire period and twenty-two states did not. The remain-
ing nine states had caps in place for part of the period.
162 David M. Studdert et al., Are Damages Caps Regressive? A Study of Mal-
practice Verdicts in California, 23 HEALTH AFF. 54, 56 (2004).
163 TEX CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 74.301 (West 2011).
164 Jonathan Selden, Texas Malpractice Insurance Rates Dropping After
Proposition 12 Passage, AuSTIN Bus. J. (Oct. 9, 2005),
http://www.bizjoumals.com/austin/stories/2005/10/10/story8.html.
165 Id.
166 David A. Hyman et al., Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical
Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, I J. LEGAL ANALYSIs 355, 355-59 (2009).
67 Kaiser Family Found., Number of Paid Medical Malpractice Claims,
STATEHEALTHFACTS.org, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetrend.jsp?typ=1 &
ind-436&cat-8&yr-63&sub=102&srgn-45 (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
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Table 1
Premiums and Volatility Measures by Damage Cap Status
(1991-2004)
Internal Medicine
Never Cap Always Cap
PREMIUM LEVELS
Mean Premium 1991 $7,510 $8,432
Mean Premium 2004 $11,708 $12,768
% Change 1991-2004 55.9% 51.4%
VARIATION IN LEVELS
Coefficient of Variation .306 .238
PREMIUM GROWTH
Mean Annual % Change 7.3% 5.9%
Std. Dev. Of % Change 22.3 15.4
General Surgery
PREMIUM LEVELS
Mean Premium 1991 $31,195 34,020
Mean Premium 2004 $41,912 46,118
% Change 1991-2004 34.4% 35.6%
VARIATION IN LEVELS
Coefficient of Variation .287 .249
PREMIUM GROWTH
Mean Annual % Change 9.1% 4.9%
Std. Dev. Of % Change 31.9 18.9
Obstetrics/Gynecology
PREMIUM LEVELS
Mean Premium 1991 $47,609 $62,210
Mean Premium 2004 $63,477 $64,910
% Change 1991-2004 33.3% 4.3%
VARIATION IN LEVELS
Coefficient of Variation .308 .228
PREMIUM GROWTH
Mean Annual % Change 7.5% 4.2%
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Std. Dev. Of % Change 26.0 20.6
Number of States 19 22
Note: These are means of state-level variables. For example, to ob-
tain the coefficient of variation (COV) for internal medicine in never
cap states (.306), we first calculate the COV=Std. Dev./mean for each
state during the 1991-2004 period and then take the un-weighted mean
across the 19 states.
In both the initial and the terminal year, average premiums for all
three specialties were higher in states with damages caps. In internal
medicine, for example, the average premium in 2004 was $11,708 in
states that never had a cap, and $1,060 higher in states that always had
a cap. The focus here, however, is not in the premium levels, but in
the stability of the premiums over time. One way to look at this is the
average annual changes in the premiums over time. These are reported
in the third row of the table. In every instance premiums grew more
slowly in the states that always had the caps. In addition, the standard
deviation in the state premiums increased in all states but increased
more slowly in the states that always had a cap. The standard devia-
tion is a measure of how tightly the state premium increases are
spread around the average premium increase. The higher the standard
deviation, the more volatile the price changes have been. The data
show that premiums increased more rapidly in the states without dam-
age caps and these states also experienced greater year-to-year varia-
tion in premium growth than states with damage caps. This suggests
that there was greater stability of premiums in the states with non-
economic damage caps.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE
Defensive medicine may both increase health care costs and re-
duce access. It is generally recognized that there are two types of de-
fensive medicine: positive (assurance behavior) and negative (avoid-
ance behavior). 168 Positive defensive medicine has an impact on costs
because it involves ordering extra diagnostic tests or performing addi-
tional procedures in order to reduce the risk of being sued for mal-
practice. Negative defensive medicine reduces access because it
6' David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist
Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2609 (2005).
169 Id. at 2609, 2616.
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involves avoiding certain classes of patients, refusing to perform cer-
tain procedures, or leaving practice altogether. 170
The definition of defensive medicine has been debated. In its 1994
report, OTA defined defensive medicine as:
... when doctors order tests, procedures, or visits, or avoid
high-risk patients or procedures, primarily (but not necessarily
solely) to reduce their exposure to malpractice liability. When
physicians do extra tests or procedures primarily to reduce
malpractice liability, they are practicing positive defensive
medicine. When they avoid certain patients or procedures,
they are practicing negative defensive medicine.' 7 1
On the other hand, Sloan & Shadle (2009), using a law and eco-
nomics approach, defined defensive medicine as "only care for which
expected cost exceeds expected benefits."' 7 2
Several studies of the prevalence of defensive medicine have re-
lied on surveys.17 3 While recognizing the shortcomings of physician
surveys, Kessler & McClellan (1997) found that survey results could
be a helpful measure of actual defensive practices.174 As noted by the
CBO (2006), however, there are problems with interpreting survey
results: physicians report both positive (additional tests and proce-
dures) and negative (avoiding procedures and patients) defensive
medicine so that it is difficult to determine the net effect on utiliza-
tion; surveys typically have a low response rates so there may be a
response bias (i.e., those with more negative feelings about the mal-
practice system are more likely to respond); and the types of questions
asked may substantially affect results (i.e., if you ask physicians
whether malpractice concerns have affected their practice they will
usually respond affirmatively, while more open-ended questions with
clinical scenarios are less likely to elicit a response indicating mal-
practice fears as a reason for ordering additional tests). 175
A 2005 study used a survey instrument to examine the prevalence
of defensive medicine in the then volatile Pennsylvania malpractice
170 Id. at 2609, 2613.
171 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 36 (1994), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/diskl/
1994/9405/9405.pdf.
172 Frank A. Sloan & John H. Shadle, Is There Empirical Evidence for "De-
fensive Medicine"? A Reassessment, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 481, 481 (2009).
173 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BACKGROUND PAPER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
TORT LIMITS AND HEALTH CARE SPENDING 8 (April 2006), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/71xx/doc7174/04-28-MedicalMalpractice.pdf.
174 Kessler & McClellan, supra note 124, at 106.
175 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 173, at 9-12.
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environment. The study concluded that defensive medicine was "high-
ly prevalent" among high risk physicians in Pennsylvania (i.e., those
in specialties with the highest medical liability insurance premiums)
and had "potentially serious implications for cost, access, and both
technical and interpersonal quality of care.'76 That study attempted to
address concerns about the difficulty of interpreting survey results
through careful design of the questionnaire and the use of aggressive
follow up techniques to ensure a high response rate. They also sought
to improve upon earlier surveys by focusing on physicians from mul-
tiple specialties in a volatile malpractice environment. Initially, they
identified six high risk specialties impacted by high medical liability
insurance rates: "emergency medicine, general surgery, neurosurgery,
9177
obstetrics/gynecology, orthopedic surgery, and radiology. ...
The questionnaire asked about both positive defensive medicine
(assurance behaviors: ordering more tests or prescribing more medi-
cally indicated, unnecessary specialist referrals, or suggesting unnec-
essary invasive procedures) and negative defensive medicine (avoid-
ance behaviors: avoiding certain procedures or high risk patients).'
As to both types of behavior, respondents acknowledging that they
engaged in the behavior were asked to provide more specific infor-
mation about their most recent act.179 Respondents were also ques-
tioned about whether they had reduced or eliminated high-risk aspects
of their practice in the last three years or planned to do so in the next
two years in response to the costs of medical liability insurance.' 80
There was an overall response rate of 65% to the questionnaire.' 8'
Most of the respondents (93%) reported they engaged in defensive
medicine.182 Fifty-nine percent reported ordering excessive diagnostic
tests,'8 3 52% reported unnecessary specialist referrals,184 one-third
reported excessive prescribing, and one-third reported suggesting un-
necessary invasive procedures.' 8 5 As to assurance behavior, among
emergency room physicians, neurosurgeons, and orthopedic surgeons,
the most commonly reported defensive act was ordering unnecessary
imaging studies. 86
176 Studdert et al., supra note 168.
177 Id at 2610.
178 id
179 id
180 id
181 id
182 Id. at 2612.
183 id.
84 Id
85 Id.
186 id
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Among obstetricians/gynecologists, the most common defensive
practice was unnecessary referrals. 87 Concerns about cancer detection
was a commonly reported motivating factor across specialties that led
to increased utilization of diagnostic imaging, specialist referrals, and
suggesting invasive procedures.' 8 ' Thirty-nine percent of respondents
reported avoidance behaviors in the form of refusing to care for high-
risk patients.8 9 And one-third reported avoiding certain procedures or
interventions.190 Mello (2005) concluded that, based on the survey of
Pennsylvania physicians, the supply of surgeons and other specialists
would likely decrease in the next two years and that physicians were
avoiding providing high risk services in response to increased costs of
medical liability insurance. 191
In 2008, the Massachusetts Medical Society released the results of
a statewide survey of practicing physicians in eight specialties (anes-
thesiology, emergency medicine, family medicine, general surgery,
internal medicine, neurological surgery, obstetrics/gynecology, and
orthopedic surgery) on the prevalence of defensive medicine. Eighty-
three percent of the respondents reported they practiced defensive
medicine.19 2 The commonly reported assurance behaviors related to
diagnostic imaging ordered for defensive purposes: 22% of X-rays;
28% of CT scans; 27% of MRIs; and 24% of ultrasounds. In addition,
28% of specialty referrals, 18 % of laboratory tests ordered, and 13 %
of hospital admissions were motivated by liability concerns.' On
avoidance behaviors, 38% reported reducing the number of high risk
services and procedures and 28% reported reducing the number of
high risk patients seen.194 Based on the survey results, the report con-
cluded that "the total cost of defensive medicine in Massachusetts
accounts for billions of dollars. 95 But there were problems with this
survey:
The response rate for the survey was too low (23.6 percent)
for the results to be considered generalizable, the validity and
187 Id.
88 Id. at 2613.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Michelle M. Mello et at., Effects of a Malpractice Crisis on Specialist
Supply and Patient Access to Care, 242 ANNALS OF SURGERY 621, 626 (2005).
192 MA. MED. Soc'v, INVESTIGATION OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN
MASSACHUSETFS 1 (2008), http://www.massmed.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=
Home6&CONTENTID=27797&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfn.
19 Id. at 3-4.
'94 Id. at 4-5.
1 Id. at 7.
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reliability of the self-report measures had not been estab-
lished, and the authors acknowledged that confirmation from
more objective measures (such as medical record review)
were warranted to uphold the validity of the survey results.196
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG) does periodic surveys of its members on professional liabil-
ity issues including defensive medicine practices. In ACOG (2009),197
of those who reported making obstetrical practice changes because of
concerns about liability insurance: "19.5% reported increasing the
number of cesarean deliveries and 19.5% indicated they stopped per-
forming or offering VBACs [vaginal birth after cesarean section] ...
21.4% decreased the number of high-risk obstetric patients, 10.4%
decreased the number of total deliveries, and 6.5% stopped practicing
obstetrics altogether."' 98 In addition, of those who reported making
obstetrical practice changes out of fear of being sued for malpractice:
"30.2% decreased the number of high-risk obstetric patients, 29.1%
reported increasing the number of cesarean deliveries, . . . 25.9%
stopped offering and performing VBACs [vaginal births after cesare-
ans] . . . 13.9% decreased the number of total deliveries, and 8.0%
stopped practicing .. 199
As to those who reported gynecological practice changes because
of concerns about liability insurance, ACOG (2009) found: "11.0%
decreased gynecologic surgical procedures . .. 4.5% stopped perform-
ing major gynecologic surgery, and 1.8% stopped performing all sur-
gery." 2 00 And as to those who reported gynecological practice changes
due to fear of being sued for malpractice, 14.7% decreased gynecolog-
ic surgical procedures, 5.2% stopped performing major gynecologic
surgery, and 2.0% stopped performing all surgery." 201 Notwithstand-
ing the responses to ACOG (2009), however, it seems unlikely that
the increased cesarean rates and decrease in VBAC were driven en-
tirely by liability concerns. For example, reimbursement policies
could be a factor in the observed rate of increase in cesarean sections
because doctors are paid more for cesarean sections than VBACs. The
196 CHRISTINE E. EIBNER ET AL., CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE SPENDING IN
MASSACHUSETTS: AN ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS 228 (2009), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical-reports/2009/RANDTR733.pdf.
97 JEFFFREY KLAGHOLZ & ALBERT L. STRUNK, OVERVIEW OF THE 2009 ACOG
SURVEY ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 1 (2009), availiable at http://www.acog.org/
departments/professionalliability/2009plsurveynational.pdf
198 Id. at 2.
'99 Id. at 3.
200 id
201 id.
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decrease in VBAC could also be influenced by concerns about the
risks to the mother.202
Reyes (2010), utilizing the results of a 2003 ACOG survey, found
that short term rising liability insurance premiums led to practice re-
ductions, but longer term rises led to greater specialization: while
some physicians focused more on obstetrics, others focused more on
I - 203gynecological surgery.
In a separate national survey of primary care physicians, nonsur-
gical specialists, surgical specialists, and other specialist respondents
reported ordering more tests and procedures than needed due to fear
of malpractice suits. 204 Over 90% of respondents also agreed that ad-
ditional medical liability reforms were needed to decrease overutiliza-
tion of diagnostic tests.20 5
In addition to surveys, there have been several empirical studies
on the prevalence of defensive medicine. Most of these have focused
on heart disease or maternity care. More recent studies have revisited
the earlier work, and explored imaging and physician services more
generally. A few recent studies have examined expenditures or overall
utilization and made inferences about defensive medicine. These stud-
ies yield mixed results as to the magnitude and generalizability of any
findings but have led the CBO to revise its view of the evidence of
defensive medicine. These studies will be discussed in the next sec-
tion.
V. THE IMPACT OF A FEDERAL DAMAGES CAP ON
COSTS
As noted supra, Republicans have argued that a federal damages
cap could reduce health care costs. And, as discussed infra, the CBO
included savings from reduced health care utilization in its estimates
of cost savings for the federal government that would result from the
enactment of a federal damages cap. Nonetheless, at this time it is not
clear that a cap will significantly reduce health care costs or that any
savings would result to consumers as result of federal medical liability
reform.
202 Cf Y. Tony Yang et al., Relationship Between Malpractice Litigation
Pressure and Rates of Cesarean Section and Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Section,
47 MED. CARE, 234, 238 (2009).
203 Wolpaw Reyes, The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Specialty of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
15841, 2010), available at-http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5841.
204 Bishop et al., supra note 39.
205 Id.
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The stated goals of proponents of health care reform were to re-
duce costs, increase access, and improve quality. 20 6 It will, however,
be difficult to accomplish these goals simultaneously. Some health
policy analysts have referred to an "iron triangle" of health care, with
three vertices: cost, access and quality.207 "In equilibrium, increasing
the performance of the health care system along any one of these di-
mensions can compromise one or both of the other dimensions, re-
gardless of the amount that is spent on health care."208
The potential impact of the ACA on health care costs is a contro-
versial topic. 20 9 Initially, CBO estimated that enactment of the health
care portions of this legislation would decrease the federal deficit by
$124 billion between 2010 and 2019.210 But if combined with the leg-
islation that reverses the cut in payment rates for physician services
under Medicare, CBO estimated that enactment of the ACA would
add $59 billion to the deficit during that same period.2 1 1 In May 2010,
the CBO estimated that the ACA would increase discretionary spend-
ing by $115 billion between 2010 and 2019.212 The CBO later noted
that while Medicare costs will continue to increase, some provisions
of the ACA have the potential to reduce outlays by decreasing pay-
ment rates for some providers and limiting per enrollee expendi-
tures.213
206 See, e.g., Nancy Pelosi, Affordable Health Care for America,
SPEAKER.GOv http://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/legislation?id=0361 (last visited
Sept. 1, 2010).
207 WILLIAM L. KiSSICK, MEDICINE'S DILEMMAS: INFINITE NEEDS VERSUS
FINITE RESOURCES 149-50 (1994).
208 U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, IMPROVING
HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 (2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/healthcarerptexecsum.pdf.
209 Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform and Cost
Control, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 601, 601 (2010); Karl Rove, The Bad News About
Obama Care Keeps Piling Up, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 17, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704198004575310773636609374.ht
ml.
2 Letter from Douglas Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget Office, to Hon.
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Rep. 2 (Mar. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ 13xx/doc ll 379/AmendReconProp.pdf.
211 Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Rep.
Paul Ryan. U.S. House of Rep. I (Mar. 19, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/ 113xx/docl l376/RyanLtrhr4872.pdf.
212 Letter from Douglas Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Rep. Jerry
Lewis, U.S. House of Rep. 2 (May 11, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/I 4xx/doc I 1490/LewisLtr HR3590.pdf.
213 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LONG TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 28 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/1I 5xx/doc 1579/06-30-LTBO.pdf.
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The chief actuary of the Centers for Medicare Services estimated
that the ACA would increase overall federal spending by $251 billion
over the 2010-2019 period, but net Medicare spending would be re-
duced by $575 billion. Overall national health expenditures were es-
timated to increase by $311 billion during 2010-2019 due to the cov-
214
erage expansion under the ACA. In a May 2010 presentation to the
Institute of Medicine, Douglas Elmendorf, Director of the CBO, not-
ed: "Rising health costs will put tremendous pressure on the federal
budget during the next few decades and beyond. In CBO's judgment,
the health legislation enacted earlier this year does not substantially
diminish that pressure."2 15 During the debate over reform the Obama
administration claimed (based on research compiled by the Dartmouth
Atlas Project) 216 that $700 billion of wasteful spending could be saved
without adversely affecting health outcomes. 217 But significant ques-
tions have now been raised about the magnitude of these potential cost
211
savings.
If, however, additional health care cost savings could be achieved
by the adoption of medical liability reforms, including a federal dam-
ages cap, it could be justified as long as there were no significant ad-
verse effects on patient safety. There is a continuing debate as to
214 Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
Estimated Financial Effects of the "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act," As
Amended 4 (Apr. 22, 2010), http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf media/2010/pdf/OACT-
Memo-FinlmpactofPPACA-Enacted.pdf. The memorandum states:
[W]e estimate that overall national health expenditures under the health re-
form act would increase by a total of $311 billion ... during calendar years
2010-2019, principally reflecting the net impact of (i) greater utilization of
health care services by individuals becoming newly covered (or having
complete coverage), (ii) lower prices paid to health providers for the subset
of those individuals who become covered by Medicaid, (but with net Medi-
caid costs from provisions other than the coverage expansion), and (iii)
lower payments and payment updates for Medicare services. Although sev-
eral provisions would help to reduce health care cost growth, their impact
would be more than offset through 2019 by the higher health care expendi-
tures resulting from the coverage expansions.
Id.
215 Douglas Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, Presentation to the Insti-
tute of Medicine: Health Care Costs and the Federal Budget 2 (May 26, 2010),
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ll 5xx/docl l544/Presentation5-26-10.pdf
216 Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, DARTHMOUTHATLAS.ORG,
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org / (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
217 Jordan Rau, Crusading Professor Challenges Dartmouth Atlas on Claims
of Wasteful Health Care Spending, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 16, 2009),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2009/November/16/Cooper-
Debate.aspx?p=1.
218 Reed Abelson & Gardiner Harris, Study Cited for Health-Cost Cuts Over-
stated Its Upside, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2010, at Al, A20.
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overall costs of defensive medicine and the potential impact of tort
reform on those costs.219 Reductions in health care costs by the im-
plementation of medical liability reform could come through reduc-
tions in medical liability insurance premiums and/or reductions in
defensive medicine. There are now several research studies suggesting
that damages caps will reduce medical liability insurance premiums,
but establishing a link between traditional tort reforms and reductions
in health care utilization has been more elusive. There have been a
number of government and industry-sponsored reports that have
looked at the impact of tort reform on health care costs. There have
also been a number of empirical studies on the impact of tort reforms
on defensive medicine. Although some of these studies have shown a
link between direct reforms such as damages caps and reductions in
the practice of defensive medicine, other studies have found no signif-
icant effect.2 20
A 1994 study on defensive medicine by the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) found that while traditional tort reforms (i.e.,
damages caps and collateral source modification) could reduce mal-
practice insurance premiums, their impacts on defensive medicine
were "largely unknown" and "likely to be small."22' Moreover, to the
extent that they could reduce defensive medicine, OTA (1994) notes
that tort reforms could do so without distinguishing between "medi-
cally appropriate" defensive practices and "wasteful" or "very costly"
222practices.
As to the potential savings from the effect of tort reform, govern-
ment agencies have been in disagreement. A 2002 study issued by the
Department of Health and Human Services estimated that a cap on
non-economic damages could save the federal government between
$25.3 billion and $44.3 billion in direct costs. 2 23 But a 2003 study by
the GAO concluded: "Although available research suggests that de-
219 MICHELLE M. MELLO, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE: A PRIMER 4 (2006), available at http://www.rwjf.org/pr/synthesis/
reports and briefs/pdf/no I primer.pdf.
220 Compare Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Malpractice Law and
Health Care Reform: Optimal Liability in an Era of Managed Care, 84 J. PUB. ECON.
175 (2002), with Sloan & Shadle, supra note 172.
221 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 2 (1994), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-ota/diskl/
1994/9405/9405.PDF.
222 Id. at 2, 13.
223 DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, CONFRONTING THE NEw HEALTH CARE
CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR
MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 7 (2002), available at http://www.hcla.org/
studies/HHSmedliabilitycrisis.pdf
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fensive medicine may be practiced in specific clinical situations, the
findings are limited and cannot be generalized to estimate the preva-
lence and costs of defensive medicine nationwide."224
A 2006 report prepared by Price Waterhouse Coopers for Ameri-
ca's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) looked at "cost drivers" that con-
tributed to the 8.8% increase in health insurance premiums from 2004
to 2005.225 It found that 10 percent of health care spending was at-
tributable to litigation costs and defensive medicine, 226 "that more
intensive diagnostic testing contributed eight tenths of a percentage
point to premium increases in 2005," and that defensive medicine
contributed to those costs.227 It suggested that 30 percent of each
health care dollar was spent on "poor quality" care and of that 30 per-
cent, 2 percent was attributable to direct litigation costs and 8 percent
to defensive medicine. 22 8
A. Empirical Studies on the Impact of Tort Reforms on Defensive
Medicine
There have been a number of empirical studies on the impact of
tort reforms on defensive medicine with conflicting results. The most
influential of the early work was undertaken by Kessler & McClellan
(1996). 229 They note: "Our study is the first to use exogenous [i.e.,
independent] variation in tort laws not related to potential idiosyncra-
sies of providers or small geographic areas to assess the behavioral
,,230 lr&M~eln(96 x
effects of malpractice pressure. Kessler & McClellan (1996) ex
amined the effects of "direct" and "indirect" malpractice tort reforms
on Medicare hospital spending on behalf of beneficiaries with acute
myocardial infarction (AMI) or new ischemic heart disease (MID) in
1984, 1987 and 1990. They also examined health outcomes measured
as one year post admission mortality or readmission for AMI or ID.
Direct reforms included the implementation of a damages cap, aboli-
tion of punitive damages, elimination of mandatory pre-judgment
interest, or the abrogation or modification of the collateral source rule.
Indirect reforms included such changes as limitations on plaintiff at-
224 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 29 (2003), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf.
225 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE FACTORS FUELING RISING HEALTH CARE
CosTs 4 (2006), http://www.ahip.org/redirect/PwCCostOfHC2006.pdf.
226 Id. at 7.
227 Id. at 12.
228 Id. at 17.
229 Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medi-
cine?, 111 Q. J. EcoN. 353, 353 (1996).
230 Id. at 386.
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torney contingency fees, mandatory periodic payments, joint and sev-
eral liability and patient compensation funds. Direct reforms were
found to reduce one year Medicare hospital payments by 5 to 9%.
Indirect reforms reduced payments by 1.8%.
Because Kessler & McClellan found no statistically significant ef-
fects on health outcomes, they concluded that direct reforms reduced
defensive medicine and improved social welfare. In a follow-up study,
Kessler & McClellan (2002) found that direct reforms reduced medi-
cal expenditures for Medicare patients with serious heart disease
(AMI and IHD) without significantly affecting health outcomes.231
They also found that "malpractice pressure" had a greater effect on
diagnostic procedures than treatments.232
Although Kessler & McClellan's results have largely been ac-
cepted, controversy remains regarding the generalizability of their
findings to overall health care spending. For example, Baker criti-
cized their attempt to extrapolate those findings into a potential over-
all savings from direct reforms of $50 billion per year nationwide.233
Further undermining the generalizability of the findings of Kessler &
McClellan, Baicker & Chandra (2004) found little evidence of
changes in treatment patterns for several different treatment protocols
for Medicare enrollees, or for overall expenses in Medicare program
due to increases in liability insurance premiums.234
More recently Sloan & Shadle (2009) have revisited the Kessler
& McClellan work using 1985-2000 Medicare claims data linked to
the National Long-Term Care Survey data. Their principal contribu-
tions were to examine ambulatory as well as hospital payments by
Medicare. Sloan & Shadle extended the Kessler & McClellan work by
examining a longer time period, 1985 through 2000, and importantly
by including ambulatory services and clinical conditions in addition to
heart disease. This is important because much of the alleged defensive
medicine is said to be undertaken by physicians in non-hospital set-
tings. Finally, Sloan & Shadle control for the health conditions of the
patients in the study, which they argue Kessler and McClellan may
not have done as effectively. Sloan & Shadle found that direct reforms
had no statistically significant effect on the broader measure of Medi-
231 Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, How Liability Affects Medical
Productivity, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 931, 933, 952 (2002).
232 Id. at 952.
233 Kessler & McClellan, supra note 229, at 387-388 discussed in BAKER,
supra note 16, at 128-130.
234 Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice Liabili-
ty on the Delivery of Health Care 18-19, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 10709, 2004).
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care spending, although the effect on AMI was similar to that found
by Kessler & McClellan. However, there were no statistically mean-
ingful effects of direct reforms on breast cancer, diabetes or stroke
cases. There were also no meaningful effects on mortality. Thus,
Sloan & Shadle concluded that the Kessler & McClellan results are
not generalizable. As they say, "Our results indicate that KM's find-
ings do not generalize to other reasons for hospital admission. They
conclude that "it seems inappropriate to conclude that tort reforms
implemented to date succeed in reducing non-beneficial care as their
proponents would have it."235
Several studies have focused on the impact of malpractice risk on
cesarean deliveries, a procedure that has been considered particularly
sensitive to malpractice risk, with mixed results. Localio et al. (1993),
using New York state hospital claims data for 1984, found that cesar-
ean delivery rates increased with malpractice risk.236 Tussing &
Wojtowycz (1997) looking at New York hospital discharge records
for 1986 found that malpractice risk was associated with increased use
of Electronic Fetal Monitoring, diagnoses of fetal distress, and use of
cesarean sections thereby increasing costs, but could not determine
whether or not defensive medicine was "good or bad in this in-
stance."237 In the first study using national birth certificate data,
Dubay et al. (1999) found that obstetricians reacted to malpractice
claims risk by performing more cesarean sections and that this effect
was greater for women from lower socioeconomic groups.238 Murthy
et al. (2007) found that higher rates of primary cesarean delivery were
associated with higher medical liability insurance premiums for Illi-
nois obstetricians-gynecologists.2 39 On the other hand, Baicker &
Chandra (2004) found little evidence that cesarean rates had increased
in response to higher malpractice premiums. 2 40 And in a study using
national data from the National Practitioner Data Bank and the Natali-
235 Sloan & Shadle, supra note 172, at 490.
236 A. Russell Localio et al., Relationship Between Malpractice Claims and
Cesarean Delivery, 269 JAMA 366 (1993). This study used five measures of
malpractice risk: "(1) relative premium levels; (2) perceived risk by geographic area
as revealed in a physician survey; (3) claims against hospitals, regardless of specialty;
(4) claims against the hospital obstetric staff taken as a group; and (5) claims against
individual physicians." Id. at 368.
237 A. Dale Tussing & Martha A. Wojtowycz, Malpractice, Defensive Medi-
cine, and Obstetric Behavior, 35 MED. CARE 172, 186-88 (1997).
238 Lisa Dubay et al., The Impact of Malpractice Fears on Cesarean Rates, 18
J. HEALTH ECON. 491, 519 (1999).
239 Karna Murthy et al., Association Between Rising Professional Liability
Insurance Premiums and Primary Cesarean Delivery Rates, 110 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1264, 1267-68 (2007).
240 Baicker & Chandra, supra note 234, at 18.
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ty Detail File, Kim (2007) found that cesarean rates were not sensitive
to malpractice risk.24 1 Dranove & Watanabe (2010) using micro-data
found a short term hospital-wide upsurge in cesarean rates among
physicians contacted about malpractice suits against them or their
colleagues and an upsurge in the use of cesareans by the responsible
physician, but these effects quickly disappeared.24 2
Some studies have focused on the impact of tort reforms on ob-
stetrical practices. Dubay et al. (1999), using Zuckerman et al.
(1990),243 found that a cap on total damages would reduce malpractice
premiums in the long run for obstetricians by 58%. Dubay et al. con-
cluded that a cap "would result in a 0.48 percentage point decline in
the rate of cesarean sections (from 15.18% to 14.71%) . . . or 3% of
the approximately 540,000 primary cesareans performed every
year." 244 They estimated that a cap on total damages would reduce
total obstetrical charges by "US $73.7 million or 0.27% of the US
$27.6 billion (1996) in obstetrical charges for women at risk of a pri-
' 245
mary cesarean section.
Currie & Macleod (2008) estimated that joint and several liability
(JSL) reforms reduced preventable complications of labor and deliv-
ery by 6%, and damages caps increased complications by 13%.246 By
way of explanation of these findings, they note:
Intuitively, if many doctors are performing procedures in
marginal cases not because of fear of liability but because the
procedures are more profitable and less time-consuming than
the alternatives, then these doctors may be more likely to per-
form these procedures when they are less fearful of liability.
On the other hand, under JSL reform, doctors are held more
accountable for their own actions (and are less likely to be
held liable for the torts committed by others). This results in
more care being taken and fewer procedures, which results in
the testable prediction that the effect of damage caps upon
241 Beomsoo Kim, The Impact of Malpractice Risk on the Use of Obstetrics
Procedures, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 79 (2007).
242 David Dranove & Yasutora Watanabe, Influence and Deterrence: How
Obstetricians Respond to Litigation Against Themselves or Colleagues, 12 Am. L. &
ECON. REV. 69, 91-92 (2010).
243 Stephen Zuckerman et al., Effects of Tort Reforms and Other Factors on
Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 27 INQUIRY 167 (1990).
244 Dubay et al., supra note 238, at 518.
245 Id. at 519.
246 Currie & MacLeod, supra note 123, at 821.
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procedure use should be the opposite of the effect of reform
of JSL.247
Using a fixed effects analysis, Yang et al. (2009) found a positive
association between malpractice premium levels and total cesarean
and primary (first time) cesarean rates, and a negative association
between malpractice premium levels and VBAC rates.248 Caps on
non-economic damages and pretrial screening panels were associated
with lower cesarean delivery rates and higher VBAC rates. 249 But they
also found that these effects were modest relative to recent changes in
practice patterns, suggesting that other factors are driving the shift
away from VBAC.250
B. CBO Estimates on the Impact of Federal Enactment of Tort Re-
forms on Aggregate Health Care Costs
During the debate over health care reform, it was contended by
Republicans and physician groups that the federal enactment of tort
reforms-particularly a cap on damages-could result in significant
savings in aggregate health care costs. The AMA based its support of
the federal damages cap on arguments that the cap will reduce the
costs of health care. 251 Republicans in Congress claimed that federal
enactment of traditional tort reforms including a $250,000 cap on non-
economic damages would result in significant savings. However, the
effect of damages caps on aggregate health care costs remains uncer-
tain.
In 2003, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), at the request of
the House Energy and Commerce Committee, estimated the potential
savings that could result from federal enactment of traditional tort
reform measures, including a cap of $250,000 on non-economic dam-
ages.252 CBO estimated that if these reforms were adopted, "premiums
for medical malpractice insurance ultimately would be an average of
25 percent to 30 percent lower than what they would be under current
law." 2 53 It also found that the proposed legislation would reduce direct
247 Id. at 797.
248 Yang et al., supra note 202.
249 Id. at 239.
250 Id at 240.
251 Am. Med. Ass'n, Medical Liability Reform Fast Facts, http://www.ama-
assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/399/mlr fastfacts.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
252 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE FOR H.R. 5: HELP EFFICIENT,
ACCESSIBLE, Low-CoST, TIMELY HEALTH CARE (HEALTH) ACT OF 2003 3 (2003),
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/40xx/doc4091/hr5.pdf.
253 Id. at 4.
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federal spending on health care programs by $14.9 billion for 2004-
2013 due to reductions in malpractice insurance premiums. 2 54
CBO (2003) further acknowledged that the impact on health in-
surance premiums would be much smaller because "[m]alpractice
costs account for a very small fraction of total health care spend-
ing." 2 55 As to the effect on health care utilization, CBO's estimate did
not include potential savings from reductions in defensive medicine. It
noted that estimating this effect would be difficult and that most stud-
ies estimating the magnitude of spending due to defensive medicine
were "speculative." The 2003 CBO report referred to empirical stud-
ies finding reductions in health care spending due to tort reforms that
focused on Medicare hospital spending on patients treated for heart
disease and Caesarean sections. But its own study "found no effect of
tort controls on medical spending in an analysis that considered a
broader set of ailments."25 6
In 2004, CBO looked at the effects of tort reform throughout the
States.2 57 It examined nine studies on the effects of tort reform and
concluded: "[e]vidence from several of the studies suggests that dif-
ferent tort reform initiatives affect the number of lawsuits filed, the
value of insurance claims, and the value of insurance payouts for
damages."258 Specifically, as to medical malpractice, it noted that
"[a]lthough statistical evidence was scant," there was some support
for the proposition that caps on non-economic damages and mandato-
ry collateral source offset "reduced some medical malpractice
costs." 25 9 While noting that tort reform could potentially reduce de-
fensive medicine and enhance efficiency,260 it reiterated that in its
2003 study CBO found no evidence that tort reforms reduced medical
spending when it applied the same methods used by Kessler and
McClellan to a broader set of ailments."26'
In 2006, CBO (2006) again looked at the effect of federal enact-
ment of traditional tort reforms on health care spending.262 It found
that while there was "some evidence of links between tort limits and
health care spending, the results are inconsistent and depend on the
254 Id. at 6.
255 Id. at 4-5.
256 Id. at 5.
257 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM
THE STATES (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/
Report.pdf
258 Id. at 11.
259 Id. at 16.
260 Id. at 18.
261 Id. at 19.
262 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 173, at 1.
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particular relationships and specifications tested." 26 3 It also noted "the
difficulty of disentangling any effects of tort limits from other factors
that affect levels of spending. . . .264 In this study, CBO looked at
both the impact of tort reform on both overall health care spending per
capita and Medicare spending per beneficiary. It found that while
eliminating joint and several liability increased per capita health care
spending, the impact of the package of tort reforms would be "near
zero."265 As to the impact on Medicare spending per beneficiary, CBO
found that while "[i]mposing a cap on non-economic damages is asso-
ciated with reductions . . . the estimated effect of that tort limit falls
and become statistically insignificant when controls are added that
capture the effects of the implementation of Medicare's prospective
payment system (PPS) for hospitals." 2 6 6
During the recent health care reform debate, the CBO estimated,
in response to a request from Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), that federal
enactment of traditional malpractice reform measures (cap on non-
economic damages of $250,000; cap on punitive damages of $500,000
or 2x economic damages; collateral source rule modification; short-
ened statute of limitations; and replacement of joint and several liabil-
ity) would reduce medical liability insurance premiums by 10 per-
cent.2 67 It further estimated that direct costs incurred by providers for
medical liability (including premiums as well as settlements, awards,
and administrative costs not covered by insurance) would be $35 bil-
lion in 2009, amounting to "2 percent of total health care expendi-
tures." 26 8 It thus concludes that "lowering premiums for medical lia-
bility insurance by 10 percent would reduce total national health care
expenditures by 0.2 percent."269
In contrast with its earlier reluctance to provide an estimate of
significant health care savings flowing from tort reforms due to reduc-
tions in defensive medicine, CBO estimated that federal enactment of
traditional tort reforms would result in "an additional indirect reduc-
tion of 0.3 percent from slightly less utilization of health care ser-
,,270
vices. CBO did, however, note one anomaly in the research: while
physicians may reduce the volume and intensity of services in re-
263 Id.
264 id
265 Id. at 3.
266 id
267 Hatch Letter, supra note 5, at 2.
268 id
269 Id. at 3.
270 Id. at 4.
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sponse to damages caps, they might increase volume and intensity in
response to reform of joint and several liability reforms.2 71
In terms of total health care spending, CBO found that federal en-
actment of traditional tort reforms "would reduce total national health
care spending by about 0.5 percent (about $11 billion in 2009)."272 As
to the impact on the federal budget, CBO found: "enactment of such a
package of proposals would reduce mandatory spending for Medicare,
Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program, and the Federal
Employees Health Benefits program by roughly $41 billion over the
next ten years. ... 273
CBO also found a potential positive impact on federal tax reve-
nues in the amount of $13 billion over the next ten years that would
result from a reduction in tax-sheltered health care spending and a
shift to taxable compensation.2 74 Thus CBO estimated that the federal
enactment of a package of traditional tort reforms would reduce the
federal budget deficit by about $54 billion during 2010-2019.
After publication of CBO's letter to Senator Hatch, Senator Rock-
efeller submitted some follow-up questions to CBO concerning "how
recent empirical analysis affected CBO's analysis, why CBO's latest
estimates of the budgetary effects of tort reform are larger than ...
previous estimates, and whether tort reform would have a negative
impact on patients' health."2 75 In response, CBO noted that while ear-
lier studies did not provide adequate support for the hypothesis that
tort reform will reduce health care utilization, more recent studies did
provide sufficient support.276
In the letter to Senator Rockefeller, CBO noted that it had in-
creased its estimate of the effect of tort reform on lowering malprac-
tice costs ("malpractice insurance premiums, and settlements, awards
and administrative costs not covered by insurance") from 6 percent to
10 percent.277 It stated that its estimate of savings from tort reform
"now incorporate a slight reduction in the utilization of health care
attributable to changes in the practice patterns of providers."27 8
As noted supra, CBO has estimated that significant savings could
be realized in the Medicare program from the enactment of a federal
damages cap because of reductions in defensive medicine. In making
271 Id. at 3.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 4.
274 Id. at 5.
275 Rockefeller Letter, supra note 6.
276 Id. at 2.
277 Id. at 4.
278 id.
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this estimate, however, it does not appear that CBO took into account
the impact of ACA's changes to the Medicare program. One major
purpose of the health care reform legislation is to transition Medicare
from a traditional fee-for-service program to a quality-based reim-
bursement system that rewards efficiency.
There are several provisions in the health care legislation that are
intended to encourage development of new models of health care de-
livery (e.g., accountable care organizations).279 There is funding for
comparative effectiveness research that presages a greater emphasis
on evidence-based medicine. 28 0 There are also programs to encourage
the development of new payment methods (e.g., payment bun-
dling).28 1
Some studies that have looked at defensive medicine have con-
cluded that managed care is a substitute for tort reform, and that de-
fensive medicine can be reduced either by tort reform measures or by
the use of managed care techniques to limit utilization. Indeed, Av-
raham et al. (2009), a study relied on by CBO, found that defensive
medicine was reduced in PPOs rather than HMOs by the enactment of
282damages caps and collateral source modification. The CBO project-
ed larger effects of federal tort reform on Medicare expenditures ow-
ing to its reliance on fee-for-service reimbursement.2 83 The Medicare
program, with its traditional fee-for-service methodology, has largely
been free of controls on utilization. Thus it seems that CBO, in esti-
mating the potential impact of a federal damages cap, should have
also considered the potential impact on utilization arising from the
transition away from a fee-for-service approach in Medicare.
CBO also responded to an inquiry from Rep. Bruce L. Braley (D-
IA) about its letter to Senator Hatch.284 In its letter to Rep. Braley,
CBO commented on the effects of tort reform on medical liability
insurance premiums and health care spending. As to the impact on
medical liability insurance premiums, CBO again cited several recent
studieS285 as well as their own analysis 2 86 finding that tort reform low-
279 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022,
124 Stat. 119, 395 (2010).
280 Id. § 6301, 124 Stat. at 727.
281 Id. §3023, 124 Stat. at 399.
282 Ronen Avraham et al., The Impact of Tort Reform on Employer-Sponsored
Health Insurance Premiums (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
15371, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 5371.
283 Rockefeller Letter, supra note 6, at 2.
284 Braley Letter, supra note 7.
285 Id. (citing Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice 'Crisis': Recent
Trends and the Impact ofState Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFF., 20 (2004)); Danzon et al.,
supra note 47, at 55; Kilgore, Morrisey & Nelson, supra note 54, at 255-69.
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ers medical liability insurance premiums. It notes that these recent
studies "are the best ones for identifying the effects of tort reform on
malpractice insurance premiums because they use data for many states
and control for the relevant characteristics of states' health care mar-
kets that may affect malpractice premiums."287
As to the impact of traditional tort reforms on health care spending,
CBO reiterated that it "concluded that the weight of empirical evidence
now demonstrates a link between tort reform and the use of health care
services." 288 Noting that, at the time of its 2006 study, it had concluded
that "there was not sufficient evidence to incorporate in its budget esti-
mates an effect of tort reform on health care utiliza-tion . . . [m]ore-
recent studies have provided further support for the hypothesis that tort
reform would slightly reduce the use of health care . . ."289 But CBO
also acknowledged that "estimates of the budgetary effects of tort re-
form are unavoidably uncertain . . . [and accordingly] the agency con-
sistently strives to produce estimates that lie in the middle of the distri-
bution of plausible outcomes based upon available knowledge."290
In concluding that tort reform will reduce health care utilization
and costs, the CBO primarily relied on four studies: Lakdawalla &
Seabury (2009),291 Avraham et al. (2009),292 Sloan & Shadle
(2009),293 and Baicker et al. (2007).294
286 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 173.
287 Braley Letter, supra note 7, at 3.
288 Id. at 4.
289 Id. at 5.
290 Id. at 4.
291 Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A. Seabury, The Welfare Effects of Medical
Malpractice
Liability (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15383, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5383.pdf.
292 Avraham et al., supra note 282.
293 Sloan & Shadle, supra note 172.
294 Katherine Baicker et al., Malpractice Liability Costs and the Practice of
Medicine in the Medicare Program, 26 HEALTH AFF. 841 (2007).
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Table 2
Studies Relied Upon by CBO
Lakdawalla & Seabury (2009)
* 1985 - 2003 AHA hospital expenditures and utilization & Medicare
Part A and Part B expenditures
* Malpractice measured as jury verdict data 1985-1999 from 2 states
and 4 cities.
* Hospital and county fixed effects regressions with alternative lagged
jury awards as the independent variable
* Analogous modeling of county death rates.
Findings:
* 10% higher noneconomic damage awards associated with 0.2 to
0.8% higher hospital costs, 0.8 to 1.2% higher Medicare Part A
spending and 0.3 to 0.6% higher Part B spending.
* "In absolute terms, this is rather a modest effect..." (page 21) but
does suggest a reduction in defensive medicine.
* Doubling malpractice costs associated with a 2% reduction in total
death rate; the effect was large for those <age 65.
* While "malpractice liability leads to modest reductions in patient
mortality; the value of these more than likely exceeds the cost im-
pacts of malpractice liability."
* "Policies that reduce expected malpractice costs are unlikely to have
a major impact on health care spending for the average patient and
are also unlikely to be cost effective..."
* "on balance, reducing malpractice costs is more likely to harm than
improve social welfare."
Avraham, Dafny & Schanzenbach (2009)
* 1998 - 2006 data from 813 employers contained in a data main-
tained by a large unnamed benefits consulting firm.
* Malpractice reforms measured by Northwestern University com-
pendium.
* Separate analyses for self-insured and purchased plans.
* Models use plan and year fixed effects.
Findings:
* Caps on non-economic damages, collateral source reform, and joint
and several liability reduce self-insured ESHI premiums by 1 to 2
percent each
* Caps on punitive damages reduce premiums by 2 to 3% but caps on
non-economic damages increase premiums for purchased plans.
* Premium reductions among self-insured plans driven by PPOs.
490 [Vol. 21:443
MEDICAL LIABILITYAND HEALTH CARE REFORM
Sloan & Shadle (2009)
* 1985-2000 National Long Term Care Survey linked to Medicare
claims data for 38,566 beneficiaries
* Examine Medicare expenditures: total, inpatient and ambulatory, as
well as spending for AMI, stroke, breast cancer and diabetes.
* Examine one year survival rates.
* Include state and year fixed effects and patient level measures of
health status.
Findings:
* Direct reforms (caps, abolition of pds, elimination of pre-judgment
interest, collateral source offset) do not significantly reduce pay-
ments for Medicare-covered services. Do find that AMI expendi-
tures are 17% lower and almost statistically significant. No effects
on other measures of spending.
* Indirect reforms (limitations on contingency fees, mandatory period-
ic payout, joint and several liability reform, and PCFs) reduced
Medicare payments for any hospitalization by 9.4% but had no ef-
fects on any clinical category of costs.
* The reforms had no statistically meaningful effects of survival.
* "assertions that tort reforms will reduce [the] waste of scarce re-
sources seems, at best, highly premature."2 95
Baicker, Fisher & Chandra (2007)
* 1991-93 and 1999-2001
* Examine level and growth in mean dollar value of (1) Medicare ex-
penditures per beneficiary, (2) per beneficiary spending for major
components of care, (3) rates of use of specific physician services.
* Malpractice payments reported in the National Practitioner Data
Bank, and malpractice premiums from Medical Liability Monitor.
* Two time periods, but no trend data.
* State variables but no fixed effects.
Findings:
* No statistically significant effect on total spending.
* 10 percent increase in average malpractice payments per physician
within a state was associated with a 1.0 percent increase in Medicare
Part B services, a 1.0 percent increase in "minor procedures," and a
2.2 percent increase in the imaging component of these services.
* The average 60% increase in average malpractice premiums be-
tween 2000 and 2003 is associated with an increase of Medicare
spending of about $16.5 billion.
295 Sloan & Shadle, supra note 172, at 490.
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The CBO conclusion, however, appears to be over-reaching.
Consider each study in turn. The Lakdawalla & Seabury (2009) study
does find that higher malpractice payouts are associated with greater
hospital and Medicare spending. However, they also find that the
higher payouts are associated with lower mortality. Thus, the cost
savings are not an unmixed blessing. Indeed, the authors conclude that
". . . on balance, reducing malpractice costs is more likely to harm
than improve social welfare." Other than in the very narrow sense of
health care spending, it seems a bit of an oversimplification to add this
study to the "reduces costs" column.
As discussed supra, the Sloan & Shadle (2009) study revisits and
expands upon the classic work by Kessler & McClellan (1996). In
essence, Sloan & Shadle confirm the Kessler & McClellan results as
they relate to direct malpractice reforms on Medicare expenditures for
heart disease. However, they did not find analogous results for stroke,
breast cancer, or diabetes, nor did they find an overall effect on Medi-
care Part A and Part B spending. Thus, they must be interpreted as
finding modest and non-generalizable results of tort reform.
The Avraham et al. (2009) study examines the effects of malprac-
tice reform laws on the premiums paid by large employers. They find
that non-economic damage caps, together with collateral source and
joint and several liability reforms each reduced premiums by 1 to 2
percent. Although they observed similar effects for self-insured and
purchased plans, their results were statistically significant only for
self-insured plans. The reforms had similarly sized effects on pur-
chased plans, but the level of statistical confidence in these estimates
was such that they may be due to chance. Thus, the results are appli-
cable only to self-insured plans offered by large employers.
Moreover, the self-insured result in Avraham et al. (2009) was
driven entirely by preferred provider organization (PPO) type plans.
Morrisey (2007) reports that nearly 70 percent of workers in PPOs are
in self-insured plans 2 96 and that 60 percent of workers are in PPOs. 29 7
This suggests that a 2 percent premium savings would apply, at most,
to approximately 42 percent of workers. Even this is an overstatement
in as much as Avraham et al. (2009) were unable to examine the ef-
fects of tort reform on plans offered by small employers. Because
such plans tend not to be self-insured, the effect on small employers
would likely be much smaller than that found for large self-insured
plans. Indeed, their focus on large self-insured employers may explain
why their results differ from Morrisey et al. (2008), a study that found
296 MICHAEL A. MORRISEY, HEALTH INSURANCE 70 (2008).
297 Id. at 16.
[Vol. 21:443492
MEDICAL LIABILITY AND HEALTH CARE REFORM
no effect of malpractice reforms on employer health insurance premi-
ums, but included small as well as large employers and did not make
distinctions between self-insured and purchased plans. 298
Finally, the Baicker et al. (2007) study finds that a 10 percent in-
crease in average malpractice settlement payments per physician was
associated with a 1.0 percent increase in Medicare Part B spending,
with analogous increases in "minor procedures" and, particularly,
increases in imaging procedures. This is suggestive of defensive med-
icine and has the advantage of examining physician out-of-hospital
behaviors, which have been identified in physician surveys as prime
examples of defensive medicine. However, in many ways, this is the
weakest of the four new studies. It focused exclusively on two short
time windows, 1991-93 and 1999-2001, rather than the fifteen years
of trend data employed in the other new studies. Under this methodol-
ogy, the effects of other intervening factors may be inappropriately
attributed to the malpractice environment. With this approach the au-
thors are unable to use the fixed effects statistical techniques used by
the other studies. Baicker and colleagues argue that a fixed effects
approach may absorb variation that is rightly attributable to the mal-
practice reforms. If so, the fixed effects models will underestimate the
true effects. On the other hand, failure to adequately control for other
factors, which fixed effects purports to do, can lead to over-estimates
of the true effect. Thus, while fixed-effects estimates may understate
the effects of malpractice reforms, Baicker and her colleagues may
have over-estimated the magnitude of the effects.
In short, the new studies greatly add to our knowledge of the ex-
istence and magnitude of defensive medicine in response to medical
malpractice fears. However, they don't move us very much in drawing
a simple conclusion about the overall effect of defensive medicine on
the costs of medical care. Yes, there is now more and better evidence
that defensive medicine exists. But there is also more and better evi-
dence that malpractice reforms have at best a small and limited impact
on health care costs.
VI. THE IMPACT OF MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM
ON ACCESS
While health care reform will provide insurance coverage for mil-
lions of persons, it could also exacerbate the shortage of primary care
298 Michael A. Morrisey, Meredith L. Kilgore & Leonard (Jack) Nelson,
Medical Malpractice Reform and Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums,
43 HEALTH SERV. RES. 2124 (2008).
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physicians.2 99 While shortages could be alleviated by expanding train-
ing programs and the roles of physician extenders such as nurse prac-
titioners, 300 it is likely that access to health care services will be com-
promised. Tort reformers have contended that liability pressure puts
further strain on physician supply. Based on currently available stud-
ies, medical liability reforms appear to have modest effects on en-
hancing physician supply, reducing avoidance behavior by physicians,
and increasing access to certain types of care.
A 2003 study by Hellinger & Encinosa (2003) found that states
with damages caps had 12 percent more physicians than states without
caps, and that states with relatively higher caps were less likely to
have more physicians than states with lower caps. 3 0' This study has
been criticized, however, because it did not control for other factors
that could have differed across states and influence physician sup-
ply. 3 02 Encinosa & Hellinger (2005) found that counties in states with
damages caps had 2.2 percent more physicians than states without
caps and rural counties in states with caps had 3.2 percent more phy-
sicians than similar counties in states without damages caps.303 This
study used a fixed effects model that reduced the influence of other
factors on their findings.
Kessler et al. (2005) found direct reforms including caps on non-
economic damages increased physician supply by 3.3% after control-
ling for state differences. 305 Matsa (2007) found that most residents of
states were not affected by improved physician supply as a result of
reforms, but that caps did increase the number of specialists in more
isolated rural areas by 10-12 percent.306 He concluded that reform had
299 Christina E. Sanchez, Health Law May Worsen Family Doctor Shortage,
TENNESSEAN (Apr. 11, 2010),
http://www.tennessean.com/article/20100411/NEWSO1/4110368/Health-law-may-
worsen-family-doctor-shortage.
3 Christina E. Sanchez, Nurse Practitioners Do Jobs of Doctors, With Less
Training, TENNESSEAN (Jun. 17, 2010),
http://www.tennessean.com/article/20100617/NEWSO1/6170342/Nurse-practitioners-
do-jobs-of-doctors-with-less-training.
301 FRED J. HELLINGER & WILLIAM E. ENCINOSA, THE IMPACT OF STATE LAWS
LIMITING MALPRACTICE AWARDS ON THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS 2
(2003), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/tortcaps/tortcaps.pdf.
302 Nelson, Morrisey & Kilgore, supra note 41, at 272.
303 William E. Encinosa & Fred J. Hellinger, Have State Caps on Malpractice
Awards Increased the Supply of Physicians?, 24 HEALTH AFF. W5-250, W5-250
(2005).
30 Nelson, Morrisey & Kilgore, supra note 41, at 272.
305 Daniel P. Kessler et al., Impact of Malpractice Reforms on the Supply of
Physician Services, 293 JAMA 2618 (2005).
306 Matsa, supra note 118, at 145.
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an impact on supply in the most rural areas because these physicians
faced higher uninsured costs and greater elasticity in demand for med-
ical services.307 He predicted that the adoption of a national cap would
result in an increase of 13 percent more specialist physicians in the
most rural areas.308
Texas is often advanced as an example of the beneficent effects
on damages caps of physician supply. In 2003, Texas adopted a
$250,000 per claimant cap on non-economic damages in malpractice
actions against physicians.309 By 2006, there had been a significant
increase in the numbers of physicians moving to Texas from other
jurisdictions. 31 0 Nonetheless, trial lawyers still claim that the situation
has not improved in rural areas in Texas. 3 1  Even after the adoption of
the cap, the Texas Department of State Health Services noted a con-
tinuing problem with the supply of primary care physicians in rural
areas.312
Arguably, malpractice reform could also reduce avoidance behav-
ior and increase access to certain types of care. In the first national
study on the effects of malpractice premiums on prenatal care, Dubay
et al. (2001) found that a decrease in malpractice premiums due to tort
reform was associated with a 3 to 5.9% reduction in the late initiation
of prenatal care for black women and a 2.2 to 4.7% reduction for
white women. 3 13 Dranove & Gron (2005), using data from Florida
between 2000 and 2003, a time when it was designated a malpractice
crisis state by the AMA because of spikes in premium levels, found
increased travel times for patients undergoing craniotomies, but not
307 Id. at 177.
308 Id.
309 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 74.301 (West 2010).
310 John Donnelly, Malpractice Curbs Hailed, Faulted: Texas Law Draws
Doctors, Frustrates Some Claimants, Bos. GLOBE (Nov. 26, 2007),
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/l 1/26/malpractice curbs hailed fa
ulted/. The article states: "The Texas Medical Board received around 2,400 license
applications a year before 2003, when voters passed Proposition 12, the ballot initia-
tive limiting malpractice awards. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, the board received
slightly more than 4,000 applications each year." Id.
311 Steve Klearman, Medical Malpractice Reform Does Not Deliver in Texas,
INJURY BOARD RENO BLOG (Nov. 8, 2007, 1:13 PM),
http://reno.injuryboard.com/medical-malpractice/medical-malpractice-reform-does-
not-deliver-in-texas.aspx?googleid=227382.
312 TEX. DEP'T OF STATE HEALTH SERVS., HIGHLIGHTS: THE SUPPLY OF
PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS IN TEXAS - 2005 3-4 (2006), available at
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/chs/hprc/PCphys.pdf.
313 Lisa Dubay et al., Medical Malpractice Liability and Its Effect on Prenatal
Care Utilization and Infant Health, 20 J. HEALTH EcoN. 591, 591, 605 (2001).
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for women undergoing high-risk deliveries.3 14 They also found de-
creased activity levels for high volume neurosurgeons, and increased
exit of low volume obstetricians. 315
VII.THE IMPACT OF MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM
ON PATIENT SAFETY
Traditional tort reforms were not designed to enhance patient
safety. Instead, they were adopted to ensure access to liability insur-
ance for providers and protect them from the volatility of the medical
liability insurance market. Intuitively, it seems that medical liability
reforms could undermine the deterrent effect of tort law and endanger
patients. But the effect, if any, of medical liability reforms on patient
safety at the hospital level is uncertain at this time.
It has been generally acknowledged that the design of effective
systems to enhance patient safety requires that providers candidly
acknowledge their errors and learn from their mistakes. 3 16 Neverthe-
less, it has been argued that the fear of litigation by providers could
impede the collection of the information necessary for improving pa-
tient safety.3 17 In the late 1990s, as part of its accreditation standards,
the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organiza-
tions (JCAHO) adopted its sentinel event policy to encourage report-
ing of errors by hospitals so that information could be shared to facili-
tate improvements in patient safety, but there was resistance to report-
ing from providers based on a lingering concern that the information
reported could end up being subject to discovery by plaintiffs' attor-
neys.
In response to these concerns, the Patient Safety and Quality Im-
provement Act of 2005 created Patient Safety Organizations to collect
and analyze confidential patient safety data from health care provid-
314 David Dranove & Anne Gron, Effects Of The Malpractice Crisis On Ac-
cess To
And Incidence Of High-Risk Procedures: Evidence From Florida, 24 HEALTH AFF.
802, 808 (2005).
315 Id.
316 JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGs., HEALTHCARE
AT THE CROSSROADS: STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM
AND PATIENT SAFETY 4-5 (2005), available at
http://www.jointconmission.org/assets/1/18/MedicalLiability.pdf; Lawrence Gostin,
A Public Health Approach to Reducing Error, 283 JAMA 1742, 1742 (2000).
317 William M. Sage, Medical Liability and Patient Safety, 22 HEALTH AFF.
26, 30 (2003).
318 Bryan A. Liang & Kevin Storti, Creating Problems as Part of the "Solu-
tion": The JCAHO Sentinel Event Policy, Legal Isssues, and Patient Safety, 33 J.
HEALTH. L. 263, 264 (2000).
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ers. It also created a federal legal privilege restricting access in civil
and criminal proceedings to this information.3 '9 But Hyman and Sil-
ver (2005) found that no "rigorous evidence show[s] that fear of mal-
practice lawsuits discourages error reporting. . . ."32 0They further ar-
gued that damages could undermine incentives for preventing er-
rors.321 Moreover, there seems to be increased receptivity to the dis-
closure of harmful medical errors to patients in the belief that disclo-
sure will actually reduce the number of malpractice claims.322
In the 1970s, medical malpractice was thought by many to be an
infrequent phenomenon and the professionalism of physicians guaran-
teed a high quality of health care.323 It is now clear though that there is
a large of pool of unintentional injuries experienced by patients as
result of receiving medical treatment, and a significant portion of the-
se injuries result from negligence.324 There have been three major
studies in the United States on the rates of negligent injuries. A 1974
study of a representative sample of patient admission records in se-
lected California hospitals found injuries from adverse events oc-
curred in 4.6 percent of admissions, 3 25 and 17 percent of these adverse
events were caused by negligence. 32 6 The Harvard Malpractice Study
of New York hospital records for 1984 found injuries from adverse
events in 3.7 percent of admissions, 32 7 and 27.6 percent of these inju-
ries were caused by negligence including a larger proportion of the
328
more severe injuries.38 The Utah and Colorado Medical Malpractice
Study (UTCOS) reviewed hospital discharge records for 1992 and
found an injury rate of 2.9 %,329 and 32.6 percent of these injuries in
Utah and 27.4 percent in Colorado were caused by negligence.3 30
319 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(a) (2006).320 David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality
in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90
CORNELL L. REv. 893, 893 (2005).
321 Id. at 989.
322 See Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Disclosing Harmful Medical Errors to
Patients, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2713 (2007).323 William M. Sage, Understanding the First Malpractice Crisis of the 21st
Century, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 1, 4-5 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2003).324 William M. Sage, The Forgotten Third: Liability Insurance and the Medi-
cal Malpractice Crisis, 23 HEALTH AFF. 10, 14 (2004).
325 DANZON, supra note 43, at 20.
326 Id.
327 Brennan et al., supra note 32, at 370.
328 id.
329 Eric J. Thomas et al., Incidence and Types ofAdverse Events and Negli-
gent Care in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261, 262 (2000).
330 Id. at 265.
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While there are pockets of high quality health care available in the
United States, the quality of care actually received by most Americans
is less than optimal. In a 2001 report, the Institute of Medicine found
significant shortcomings in the quality of health care received by
many Americans, particularly those suffering from chronic conditions,
and called for a restructuring of the health care system. 331' The report
noted: "During the last decade alone, more than 70 publications in
leading peer-reviewed journals have documented serious quality
shortcomings."332 One important aspect of quality care is patient safe-
ty, but the link between the medical liability climate and patient safety
is somewhat murky. A Rand Corporation study found that adults re-
ceived only about half of the recommended care for various acute and
chronic care conditions as well as preventive care. 333 Of the twelve
communities studied, the RAND study found that the highest quality
health care was being delivered in Seattle, Washington, located in a
state identified at that time by the AMA as a malpractice crisis
state.334 It also found health care quality higher in communities in six
crises states than in California and Indiana, two states with damages
caps in place since 1975 that were not identified as crisis states.335
On the other hand, Mello et al. (2004) surveyed Pennsylvania
physicians in high-liability risk specialties finding that physician angst
about medical liability issues could have an impact on the interper-
sonal quality of care. 3 36 This study reported that "specialists who felt
heavily financially burdened by malpractice insurance costs were least
likely to report satisfaction with their practice." 337 Some survey re-
spondents indicated liability concerns had eroded their clinical auton-
omy and attributed their reduced ability to provide quality care to their
patients to the increased volume of patients and reductions in adminis-
trative support as necessitated by the increasing cost of medical liabil-
* * 338ity insurance.
331 INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEw HEALTH SYSTEM
FOR THE 2 1 ST CENTURY 2-9 (200 1).
332 Id. at 3.
333 Eve A. Kerr et al., Profiling the Quality of Care In Twelve Communities:
Results From the CQI Study, 23 HEALTH AFF. 247, 247 (2004); Elizabeth A.
McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United States,
348 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2641 (2003).
334 Kerr et al., supra note 333, at 251; AMA and Consumer Group Debate
Tort Reform Efforts, 20 MED. ETHics ADVISOR 80, 80-81 (2004).
335 Kerr et al., supra note 333, at 251; AMA and Consumer Group Debate
Tort Reform Efforts, supra note 334, at 81.
336 Michelle M. Mello et al., Caring For Patients in a Malpractice Crisis:
Physician Satisfaction and Quality of Care, 23 HEALTH AFF. 42 (2004)
337 Id. at 48.
331 Id. at 49-51.
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While avoiding the controversy over malpractice reform, a series
of reports from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) have highlighted the
problems of patient safety and quality.33 9 To Err is Human: Building a
Safer Health Care System (2000), the landmark report issued by the
Institute of Medicine (IOM), estimated there were between 44,000
and 98,000 hospital patient deaths annually due to preventable adverse
events. 3 40 IOM (2002) called for federally-funded state-level medical
liability demonstration projects focused on patient safety. It recom-
mended two options for participating states: (1) a provider-based early
offer of settlement coupled with federal reinsurance and state-enacted
caps on non-economic damages "for identifiable classes of avoidable
injuries," and (2) state administrative systems for claims resolution
that would grant immunity to providers from tort liability in exchange
for their participation. 34 1
IOM (2004) also recommended: (1) the creation of a national
health information system, (2) the establishment of comprehensive
patient safety programs in all health care settings operated by trained
personnel in a culture of patient safety that would focus on analysis of
adverse events and near misses, and (3) an improved system for re-
porting medical errors. 342 It opined that "patient safety is indistin-
guishable from the quality of care" and called for the creation of a
new health care delivery system "that is capable of preventing errors
from occurring in the first place, while at the same time incorporating
lessons learned from any errors that do occur." 343
IOM (2007) found that hospital patients were subject to an aver-
age of one medication error each day with a significant variation in
error rates across facilities. 344 The report also found that there were
annually at least 1.5 million "adverse drug events" (ADEs)--serious
3 Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors:
Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reforms, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1595, 1600 (2002).
340 INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). But cf Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer,
Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to Medical Errors: Preventability Is in the Eye of the
Reviewer, 286 JAMA 415, 419 (2001) (focusing on patient deaths in V.A. hospitals,
conceding that medical errors are a significant problem, and arguing that IOM num-
bers on hospital patient deaths attributable to medical errors are too high).
341 INST. OF MED., FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE: LEARNING
FROM SYSTEM DEMONSTRATIONS 10 (Janet M. Corrigan et al. eds., 2002), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record id=10565&page=Rl.
342 INST. OF MED., PATIENT SAFETY: ACHIEVING A NEw STANDARD OF CARE
(2004), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=10863&page=l.
343 Id. at 5.
344 COMM. ON IDENTIFYING & PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS, INST. OF
MED., PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS 4 (Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2007) available
at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=l 1623&page=5.
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medication errors-in nursing homes, outpatient settings, and hospi-
tals excluding failure to prescribe medically indicated drugs. 34 5
A number of public and private patient safety initiatives followed
the release of To Err is Human.346 The Leapfrog Group, an employer
consortium, developed patient safety initiatives ("three leaps"):
"Computerized Prescriber Order Entry," "ICU Physician Staffing,"
and "Evidence Based Hospital Referrals" (limiting referrals only to
hospitals that meet certain volume criteria).3 47 In 2002, JCAHO estab-
lished the National Patient Safety Goals Program "to help accredited
organizations address specific areas of concern in regards to patient
safety."3 48 Also in 2002, JCAHO, together with the Center for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services (CMS), launched the Speakup Program,"
a national program to urge patients to take a role in preventing health
care errors by becoming active, involved and informed participants on
the health care team . .. In 2003, JCAHO adopted the "Universal
Protocol for Preventing Wrong Site, Wrong Procedure and Wrong
Person Surgery." 3 50
In 2002, in reaction to increasing concerns about patient safety,
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) developed a
list of twelve Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs). 351 The definition of
patient safety used by AHRQ, borrowed from To Err is Human, was:
"freedom from accidental injury caused by medical care, which trans-
lates to medical errors." 352 The initial twelve PSIs focused on events
with a high likelihood of being caused by a medical error, such as
foreign objects left in the body. 353 The list was later expanded to
twenty PSIs that focused "on potentially preventable instances of
345 Id. at 4-5.
346 Drew E. Altman et al., Improving Patient Safety-Five Years after the
IOMReport, 351 NEw ENG. J, MED. 2041, 2041 (2004).
347 AUNG K. LwIN & DONALD S. SHEPARD, ESTIMATING LIVES AND DOLLARS
SAVED FROM UNIVERSAL
ADOPTION OF THE LEAPFROG SAFETY AND QUALITY STANDARDS: 2008 UPDATE 1
(2008), available at
http://www.leapfroggroup.org/media/file/LivesSaved LeapfrogReport 2008-
Final (2).pdf
348 Facts About Patient Safety, THE JOINT COMM'N (Jan. 18, 2011),
http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/l/18/PatientSafety_1 1411.pdf.
349 Id.
350 Id.
351 Marlene R. Miller et al., Patient Safety Indicators: Using Administrative
Data to Identify Potential Patient Safety Concerns, 36 HEALTH SERV. RES. 110, 121
(2001).
352 Id. at 112.
353 Patrick S. Romano et al., A National Profile of Patient Safety in U.S. Hos-
pitals, 22 HEALTH AFF. 154, 154 (2003).
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harm to patients, such as surgical complications and other iatrogenic
events."354 These twenty PSIs were defined as "measures that screen
for potential problems that patients experience resulting from expo-
sure to the health care system, and that are likely amenable to preven-
tion by changes at the level of the system." 355
PSIs relate to "inpatient care, and the adverse events that have ei-
ther a high likelihood or at least a reasonable possibility of being iat-
rogenic." 356 Using PSIs, Romano et al. (2003) found that in 2000,
1.12 million potential patient safety events occurred in nonfederal
acute care hospitals.357 They also found, however, that the incidence
of most PSIs had declined since 1995 "with the notable exception of
postoperative medical complications, decubitus ulcer, and infection
due to medical care."358
Although originally intended for use as quality improvement tools
and screening mechanisms, PSIs have increasingly been used for pub-
lic reporting to compare hospitals and pay-for-performance rewards
for hospitals with high levels of safety.359 Rivard et al. (2006) found
that PSIs could be a useful quality improvement tool at the organiza-
tional level when used with other data to make system changes to im-
prove patient safety.3 60 Isaac & Jha (2008), however, found poor or
inverse relationships between PSIs and other quality measures thereby
suggesting a need for further validation. 3 6 1 Romano et al. (2009) ex-
amined the criterion validity of selected surgical PSIs using clinical
data from V.A. hospitals.362 They found moderate sensitivities and
high specificity, but concluded that there should be further validity
354 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, TECHNICAL REVIEW
FIVE: MEASURES OF PATIENT SAFETY BASED ON HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATIVE DATA-
THE PATIENT SAFETY INDICATORS 1 (2002), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/evidence/pdf/psi/psi.pdf.
355 Id
356 Id. at 2.
357 Romano et al., supra note 353, at 157.
358 Id. at 163.
359 Patrick S. Romano et al., Validity of Selected AHRQ Patient Safety Indica-
tors Based on VA National Surgical Quality Improvement Program Data, 44 HEALTH
SERV. RES. 182, 183 (2009).
360 Peter E. Rivard et al., Enhancing Patient Safety through Organizational
Learning: Are Patient Safety Indicators a Step in the Right Direction?, 41 HEALTH
SERV. RES. 1633 (2006).
361 Thomas Isaac & Ashish K. Jha, Are Patient Safety Indicators Related to
Widely Used Measures
ofHospital Quality?, 23 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 1373, 1376-77 (2008).362 Romano et al., supra note 359.
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testing before most of the PSIs are used to publicly compare hospi-
tals.363
Health care providers should have strong incentives to make in-
vestments in improved patient safety. As noted, supra, Rand (2010)
found that reductions in the number of PSIs resulted in a decline in
medical malpractice claims. 364 In addition, significant savings to the
health care system could result from a decrease in the rate of prevent-
able injuries. IOM (2000) estimated the annual costs of preventable
medical errors at $17 to 29 billion annually. 36 5 The Leapfrog Group
(2004) estimated that universal adoption of its "three leaps" could
result in a substantial number of injuries prevented and lives saved.3 6 6
Zhan & Miller (2003) "use[d] the PSIs and administrative data to as-
sess excess length of stay (LOS), charges, and deaths attributable to
medical injuries during hospitalization" in 994 acute-care hospitals in
twenty-eight states for 2000.367 They found that, for the types of med-
ical injuries studied, preventable errors may result in $4.6 billion in
excess national health care costs annually.3 68 IOM (2007) noted: "As-
suming conservatively an annual incidence of 400,000 in-hospital
preventable ADEs, each incurring extra hospital costs of $5,857,
yields an annual cost of $2.3 billion in 1993 dollars or $3.5 billion in
2006 dollars." 3 69 At least 25% of these ADEs were preventable, ac-
cording to IOM (2007).370 Milliman (2010), a study commissioned by
the Society of Health Care Actuaries, found that the costs of medical
errors for 2008 were $19.5 billion. 37 1 In addition, these errors resulted
in 2,500 excess deaths and 10 million excess missed workdays. 372
Patient safety advocates have tried to make the case that hospitals
should view patient safety activities that reduce health care costs and
medical liability exposure as a cost effective strategy. But Mello et al.
363 Id. at 199.
3 GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 160.
365 INST. OF MED., supra note 340, at 27.
366 JOHN D. BIRKMEYER & JUSTIN B. DIMICK, THE LEAPFROG GROUP'S
PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICES, 2003: THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF UNIVERSAL ADOPTION
(2004), available at http://www.leapfroggroup.org/media/file/Leapfrog-
Birkmeyer.pdf.
367 Chunlui Zhan & Marlene R. Miller, Excess Length of Stay, Charges, and
Mortality Attributable to Medical Injuries During Hospitalization, 290 JAMA 1868,
1869 (2003).
368 Id. at 1872.
369 COMM. ON IDENTIFYING & PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS, supra note
344, at 5.
370 Id. at 6.
371 JON SHREVE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC MEASUREMENT OF MEDICAL ERRORS 5
(2010), available at http://www.soa.org/files/pdf/research-econ-measurement.pdf.
372 Id.
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(2007) using records from hospitals in Utah and Colorado found that,
on average, hospitals were able to externalize "78 percent of the costs
of all injuries, and 70 percent of the costs of negligent injuries . ..
They further concluded that the deterrent effects of tort law were un-
dermined by the relatively small number of negligently injured pa-
tients that were compensated for their injuries.374
Will the passage of traditional malpractice reform legislation fur-
ther dilute the incentives for providers to invest in patient safety im-
provements? Commentators have noted the weakness of deterrence in
the current medical liability system. And it has been argued that
traditional tort reforms could further weaken deterrence thereby in-
creasing injuries related to medical errors. But in its response to Sena-
tor Hatch, the CBO noted that "[t]here is less evidence of the effect of
tort reform on people's health . .. than about its effects on health care
spending-because many studies of malpractice costs do not examine
health outcomes." 376 It further noted that the evidence of recent stud-
ies was mixed: Lakdawalla & Seabury (2009) found that a 10 percent
reduction in medical malpractice costs would result in an increased
overall mortality rate of 0.2 percent while Kessler & McClellan (1996
and 2002) and Sloan & Shadle (2009) found "no significant adverse
outcomes for patients' health."3 77 Klick & Stratmann (2003) found
that collateral source reform resulted in a statistically significant in-
crease in infant mortality rates. Shepherd (2008) found that caps on
non-economic damages and punitive damages were associated with
decreases in accidental death rates, while caps on total damages and
collateral source reforms were associated with increases in the rate of
accidental death.379
In a follow-up letter to Senator Rockefeller, CBO noted that these
mixed results may be due to the "complicated relationship between
malpractice claims and medical errors."380 In this regard it noted the
findings of the Harvard Medical Practice Study that a majority of hos-
373 Michelle M. Mello et al., Who Pays for Medical Errors? An Analysis of
Adverse Event Costs, the Medical Liability System, and Incentives for Safety Im-
provement, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 835, 852 (2007).
374 Id. at 853.
37 Mello & Brennan, supra note 339, at 1615-16.
376 Hatch Letter, supra note 5.
37 Id.
378 JONATHAN KLICK & THOMAS STRATMANN, DOES MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
REFORM HELP RETAIN PHYSICIANS AND DOES IT MATTER? 3 (2003), available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20030910_Reform.pdf.
379 Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms' Winners and Losers: The Competing
Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 939 (2008).
380 Rockefeller Letter, supra note 6, at 6.
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pital patients who suffered negligently-caused injuries never filed
claims, while a substantial portion of filed claims did not stem from
negligently inflicted injuries.381 And in a subsequent letter to Repre-
sentative Braley, CBO noted: "the limited evidence currently availa-
ble about the effects of tort reform on health outcomes is much more
mixed than the larger collection of evidence currently available about
the effects of tort reform on health care spending." 38 2 Thus the effect,
if any, of the enactment of malpractice reform legislation on the rate
of PSIs at the hospital level is unknown at this time. Clearly, this is an
area where more research is needed.
VIII. ALTERNATIVE MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM
PROPOSALS
The AMA has supported federal funding for state demonstration
projects to test alternative approaches to malpractice reform.3 83
During a June 15, 2009, speech to the AMA, the audience cheered
President Obama's statement that medical liability reform should be
included in health care reform, but roundly booed his statement that
he did not support damages caps. 384 Nonetheless, the outgoing Presi-
dent of the AMA announced she was "thrilled" that the President was
willing to talk to the group about including medical liability reform in
health care reform.385 She was probably heartened by the President's
acknowledgment that defensive medicine has contributed to the high
cost of health care.386 President Obama's statement supporting medi-
cal liability reform at the AMA convention was undoubtedly motivat-
ed in part by a desire to defuse physician opposition to his health care
reform efforts.
381 Id.
382 Braley Letter, supra note 7, at 3.
383 Health System Reform Insight, Am. MED. Ass'N (Jun. 24, 2010),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/health-system-reform/resources/insight/june-
2010/24june2010.shtml.
384 Carrie Budoff Brown, Obama Talks Up Liability Reform, POLITICO (June
15, 2009), available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/23783.html.
385 Id.
386 Text of Obama's Speech to the AMA, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (June
15, 2009, 12:14 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/06/15/text-of-obamas-speech-
before-the-ama/.
387 Alex Nussbaum, Malpractice Lawsuits are "Red Herring" in Obama
Plan, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=az9qxQZNmfo (citing
to Chandra et al., supra note 18).
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While President Obama has not supported a federal cap on dam-
ages, 38 8 he has supported alternative tort reform measures. In a meet-
ing with the incoming President of the AMA and a series of meetings
with Senate Democrats in the spring of 2009, President Obama indi-
cated his interest in legislation that would create a safe harbor for doc-
tors that follow evidence-based professional practice guidelines. 8 In
2006, he also co-sponsored legislation with Hillary Clinton that would
have encouraged health care providers to report medical errors, dis-
close them to patients, provide an apology, and agree to negotiate
compensation while preserving a patient's right to sue.3 90 Although it
has not yet been established that disclosure-and-offer programs and
safe harbors for adherence to evidence-based guidelines will reduce
medical liability insurance costs, 391 the AMA has supported both of
these reform proposals.392
President Obama later announced that he was directing the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services to move forward on funding med-
ical liability demonstration projects in the states during a September 9,
2009, address to Congress. 39 3 The House Bill included a provision
that excluded certain guidelines developed under the legislation from
being used to establish the standard of care in malpractice actions,
coupled with a savings clause for state malpractice actions.394 It also
included an incentive payment program for states to adopt effective
alternatives to the current medical liability system, but further provid-
388 John Gibeaut, Pop the Caps, A.B.A. J., May 2010, at 16, 17.
389 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Open to Reining in Medical
Suits, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2009, at Al.
390 National Medical Error Disclosure and Compensation Act, S. 1784, 109th
Cong. (2005).
391 Mello & Brennan, supra note 2, at 2-3.
392 Letter from AMA and other Groups to President Barack Obama (June 1,
2009), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/3 I/stakeholders-
to-obama.pdf. An addendum to the letter from the AMA states:
Physicians who adhere to evidenced based best practice guidelines are not
protected from lawsuits in our current liability system. Congress needs to
enact liability protections for physicians who adhere to best practice guide-
lines and fund state demonstration projects to test alternative reforms such
as health courts, administrative compensation systems and early offer initia-
tives.
Id.
3 Fact Sheet: Patient Safety and Medical Liability Reform Demonstration,
HEALTHCARE.Gov, http://healthreform.gov/newsroom/factsheet/medicalliability.html
(last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
394 Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 261
(2009).
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ed that those incentive payments were not available for states that cap
damages. 395
The ACA includes a "Sense of the Senate" that "States should be
encouraged to develop and test alternatives to the existing civil litiga-
tion system . .. while preserving an individual's right to seek redress
in court. ... .396 It also provides funding for state demonstration pro-
jects of "alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving disputes
over injuries allegedly caused by health care providers. . . ."397
Physician groups have supported alternative reforms as add-ons to
damages caps. While it has continued to advocate for MICRA-style
reforms, the AMA has recognized that alternative reforms such as
health courts, use of court-appointed expert witnesses, restrictions on
expert witnesses hired by parties, and health claim ombudsman/pre-
trial screening panels could be a valuable add-on to a damages cap. 39 8
James Rohack, the President of the AMA, recently praised federal
funding for alternative malpractice demonstration projects under the
ACA.
In 1988, the AMA/Specialty Society Medical Liability Project, a
coalition composed of the AMA and thirty-one specialty societies,
proposed that states adopt legislation authorizing a new state agency
or a revamped medical disciplinary board to establish a fault-based
administrative compensation scheme that would replace the current
tort system. 4 00 The proponents of the fault-based administrative sys-
tem argued that "[t]he current tort system precludes many patients
with relatively small damage claims from receiving any compensation
for injuries caused by medical negligence." 40 1 They noted that victims
of malpractice do not receive equal treatment in cases where compen-
sation was provided; some victims were overcompensated and others
. Id. at § 253 1(a)(4)(B).
396 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6801,
124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010).
3 Id. at § 10607.
398 AM. MED. Ass'N, LEGISLATIVE TEMPLATE: MEDICAL COURTS AND OTHER
MICRA ENHANCEMENTS (2004), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/378/healthcrts-micra.pdf.
399 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, An Important Step on Medical Malpractice Re-
form, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG, (June 11, 2010, 7:27 PM EST),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/06/1 l/important-step-medical-malpractice-
reform-0.
400 Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Re-
solving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1365 (1989).
401 Id. at 1367.
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were undercompensated.402 They argued that reliance on juries is an
inefficient and unreliable method for deciding malpractice cases.403
Under the fault-based administrative system proposal, malpractice
claims were to be decided through an "administrative adjudicatory
process." 404 An attorney was to be provided at state expense for those
whose claims were deemed meritorious after an initial review pro-
cess.40 5 The proposal also included such traditional tort reform
measures as a cap on non-economic damages, collateral source rule
modification, and the periodic payout of future damages. It proposed a
liberalized fault standard (the reasonable prudent physician standard
rather than the state's customary standard). Yet the standard could
have easily evolved into a no-fault system because the state agency
was to be given rulemaking authority to include, after a five-year
moratorium, the authority to promulgate more specific liability guide-
lines.406 Thus the state agency could adopt a schedule of compensable
events (e.g., Accelerated Compensation Events (ACEs)) 40 7 that would
obviate the need for proving fault.
The AMA stopped promoting its fault-based administrative sys-
tem, probably because of the increasing certitude that its adoption
would result in a significant increase in the number of claims. 40 8 But
some physician groups now support a similar reform: the creation of
specialized tribunals known as health or medical courts to adjudicate
malpractice claims. 409
ACOG has supported proposed legislation in New York State to
adopt a no-fault compensation scheme for birth-related neurological
injuries that is a variant of schemes adopted in Virginia and Florida.4 10
402 Id. at 1367-69.
403 Id. at 1370-71.
404 Id. at 1379.
405 Id. at 1381.
406 Id. at 1384-85
407 See, e.g., Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Rethinking Re-
sponsibility for Patient Injury: Accelerated-Compensation Events, A Malpractice and
Quality Reform Ripe for a Test, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 147 (1991). ACEs are
medically caused injuries that are usually preventable by the exercise of good care.
Experts have developed several lists of ACEs. Id. at 149. ACEs could be used as the
basis for compensating those who have suffered a listed injury "without individual-
ized fault finding." Id. at 151.
408 MARK A. HALL ET AL., MEDICAL LIABILITY AND TREATMENT
RELATIONSHIPS 392 (2008).
409 Id.
410 Richard L. Berkowtiz et al., A Proposed Model for Managing Cases of
Neurologically Impaired Infants, 113 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 683, 685 (2009).
The Virginia and Florida programs are described in Mello, et al., Adjudicating Severe
Birth Injury Claims in Florida:The Experience of a Lanmark Experiment in Personal
Injury Compensation, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 493 (2008), as follows:
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This proposal was distinguished from Virginia and Florida versions
by its broader scope, the inability to opt-out, and its requirement that
negligence be determined and, if found reported, to licensing officials
and the National Practitioner Data Bank.4 11 There is also a require-
ment that de-identified information on cases determined to be caused
by negligence be disseminated for teaching purposes.412
The National Medical Association (NMA), a group primarily
comprising African American physicians, has also endorsed tradition-
al tort reform measures, noting that: "frivolous lawsuits and skyrock-
eting malpractice insurance premiums are driving America's physi-
cians out of business. In the minority community this is likely to
translate into an exacerbation of healthcare disparities."413 The NMA
has endorsed federal legislation imposing caps on non-economic dam-
ages, "reforming the process by which insurance companies set the
premiums paid for malpractice insurance coverage," but it has also
called for the adoption of health courts as a solution to these prob-
lems. 414
There is also great interest in alternative reforms among academic
researchers that would connect malpractice reforms with overall
health policy concerns and integrate improved patient safety with lia-
bility protection.4 Baker proposed a "blueprint" for state reforms,
"the Patient Protection and Healthcare Responsibility Act," that in-
cludes the following evidence-based reforms: mandatory disclosure of
possible "adverse health-care event[s]," incentives for at-fault provid-
ers to apologize and offer restitution, a no-fault compensation scheme
for "moderate" injuries, and enterprise liability.4 16 Baker has suggest-
These programs carve out a category of adverse events within a defined
clinical area (obstetrics and neonatology) that carry a rebuttable presump-
tion of compensability. Compensation is awarded based on the nature of the
outcome and a finding that the outcome is causally linked to the birth pro-
cess (rather than on the basis of a finding or negligence or avoidability).
Unless certain conditions are met, patients who experience these events
while under the care of providers who participate in the systems must seek
compensation through a non-judicial process.
Id. at 497.
411 Berkowtiz et al., supra note 410, at 685-86.
412 Id. at 685.
413 Where the NMA Stands, NAT'L MED. Ass'N,
http://nmanet.org/index.php?/HealthPol sub/where the nma_stands/ (last visited
Feb. 15, 2011).
414 Id.
415 Eleanor D. Kinney & William M. Sage, Resolving Medical Malpractice
Claims in the Medicare Program: Can It Be Done, 12 CONN. INS. L. J. 77, 79-80
(2005-2006).
416 BAKER, supra note 16, at 157-65.
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ed the following goals for medical liability reformers: "reducing pa-
tient injuries, improving the accuracy of medical malpractice claim-
ing, improving patient compensation, and reducing the disruption that
the insurance cycle imposes on doctors."417
Traditional tort reforms have been more focused on reducing lia-
bility insurance costs for providers and stabilizing insurance markets
rather than deterring negligence and providing fair compensation for
the victims of malpractice. Sage (2004) noted the apparent disconnect
between traditional medical liability reform proposals such as damag-
es caps and the need to approach medical liability from a health policy
perspective.418 He called for states to consider reforms that would
speed resolution of claims, shift to a first party from a third party ba-
sis, and "link liability risk management with clinical quality im-
provement at the institutional level." 419 He also called for federal sup-
port for state demonstration projects that would include federal subsi-
dies for reinsurance and the implementation of an administrative
compensation system in the Medicare program to compensate for
"avoidable injuries."420
In addition, a 2004 IOM Report called for experimentation with
alternatives to traditional tort reform measures that would both en-
hance patient safety and stabilize the medical liability insurance mar-
ket.4 2 ' The report called for federal and state support for demonstra-
tion projects that would utilize one of two options. Under the first
option the federal government would provide reinsurance and tech-
nical support for demonstration projects that would require providers
to identify avoidable injuries and promptly compensate injured pa-
tients for net economic losses and limited non-economic damages
based on caps set by state law.422 Under the second option, the state
would require that all health care providers participate in a statewide
administrative claims system that would provide recovery for avoida-
ble injuries. The providers would be granted immunity from tort lia-
bility. Providers would be required to identify victims of avoidable
injuries and disclose these to the patients. And injured patients could
recover net economic losses and non-economic losses subject to a
cap.423
417 Id. at 158.
418 Sage, supra note 324, at 10.
419 Id. at 19.
420 Id. at 18-20.
421 INST. OF MED., supra note 341, at 81-90.
422 Id. at 87.
423 Id. at 88.
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In this section we will examine two proposals for alternative re-
forms that seem promising: disclosure and offer, and health courts.424
These options do not necessarily require specific legislation and could
be implemented at the institutional level.425 Indeed, some providers
and insurers have already initiated disclosure and offer programs.
There is increased interest in such reforms by institutional providers,
particularly in light of the fact that damages caps have been declared
unconstitutional by several state high courts and federal enactment of
caps seems very unlikely in the foreseeable future.
A. Disclosure and Offer
Although physicians, hospitals and liability insurers have tradi-
tionally been reluctant to disclose medical injuries for fear of stirring
up additional claims, the ethical obligation of providers to disclose
negligently inflicted injuries is widely acknowledged.426 Within the
profession there is "increasing receptivity" to full disclosure.427 The
AMA Code of Medical Ethics recognizes the obligation of a physician
to inform the patient about an injury caused by the physician's negli-
428
gence. Since 2001, JCAHO has required institutional providers to
inform patients of "unanticipated outcomes." 429 And in 2006, the Na-
tional Quality Forum endorsed a safe practice requiring timely disclo-
sure of "serious unanticipated outcomes" to patients. 430 The latter is
particularly significant because "the 29 large health care purchasing
coalitions in the Leapfrog Group use the NQF safe practices as stand-
ards in their pay-for-performance programs."43 1
424 Mello & Brennan, supra note 2, at 2-3.
425 Michelle M. Mello & Thomas A. Gallagher, Malpractice Reform-
Opportunities for Leadership by Health Care Institutions and Liability Insurers, 362
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1353, 1353 (2010).
426 William M. McDonnell & Elisabeth Guenther, Narrative Review: Do State
Laws Make it Easier to Say "I'm Sorry?", 149 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 811, 811
(2008).
427 Gallagher et al., supra note 322, at 2713.
428 Am. MED. Ass'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, OPINION 8.12-PATIENT
INFORMATION (1994), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-
resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion812.shtml.
429 M. D. Cantor, Telling Patients the Truth: A Systems Approach to Disclos-
ing Adverse Events, 11 QUALITY & SAFETY IN HEALTH CARE 7 (2002).
430 NAT'L QUALITY FORUM, SAFE PRACTICES FOR BETTER HEALTHCARE
(2006), available at
http://www.qualityforum.org/Publications/2007/03/SafePractices forBetterHealth
care%E2%80%932006 Update.aspx.
431 Gallagher et al., supra note 322, at 2714.
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Proponents of disclosure and offer have argued that the infor-
mation from disclosure can be used to enhance patient safety.432 They
contend that apologizing to the patient also has salutary effects: it
benefits the patient emotionally, mitigates the harm, and preserves the
physician-patient relationship.43 3 And it has been argued by the "Sorry
Works! Coalition" that disclosure and apology will reduce the fre-
quency of malpractice claims and litigation costs. 4 34 Nonetheless,
physicians may still be unwilling to apologize because of fear that the
apology could be admissible in a lawsuit. 43 5 To combat that concern,
thirty-five states have now enacted apology laws to encourage disclo-
sure of negligently inflicted injuries by precluding at least some
436 ae
statements of apology from being admissible in court. A few states
have coupled inadmissibility provisions with a disclosure and/or re-
porting mandate.4 3'
There is, however, an emerging consensus that disclosure and
apology alone are insufficient and should be accompanied by an offer
to compensate the negligently injured patients injured. In 2006, Sena-
432 McDonnell & Guenther, supra note 426.
433 Id.
434 Doug Wojcieszak et al., The Sorry Works! Coalition: Making the Case for
Full Disclosure, 32 J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 344 (2006).
435 McDonnell & Guenther, supra note 426.
436 Richard C. Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice
Claims? The University of Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 125,
131-32 (2009). Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Disclosing Harmful Medical Errors to
Patients, 356 N. ENG. J. MED. 2713 (2007) note:
State governments have pursued a greater range and volume of disclosure-
related legislation. Seven states-Nevada, Florida, New Jersey, Pennsylva-
nia, Oregon, Vermont, and California-have mandated that institutions dis-
close serious unanticipated outcomes to patients. Pennsylvania's 2002 law
was the first and arguably stands as the sternest. It requires hospitals to noti-
fy patients in writing within 7 days after a "serious event." To counteract
concerns about litigation exposure, the law includes a provision prohibiting
the use of such communications as evidence of liability for the disclosed
event. Interest in adopting this type of legal protection has been widespread
and is not limited to states with disclosure mandates. At least 34 states have
adopted "apology laws" that protect specific information conveyed in dis-
closures, most commonly apologies or other expressions of regret.
Id. at 2715 (citations omitted).
437 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.855 (West 2003) (patient involved to be
given notice of sentinel event); N.J. STAT. ANN. §. 26:2H-12.25 (2004) (reporting
mandate for "serious preventable adverse events"; patient disclosure mandate for
"serious preventable adverse events" related to allergic reactions); 40 PA. CONs. STAT.
ANN. § 1303.308 (2002) (health care worker required to report a "serious event or
incident" to facility; facility required to inform patient or family of a "serious
event.")); McDonnell & Guenther, supra note 426, at 812 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. §
395.1051 (2003) (patient disclosure mandate for adverse events causing "serious
harm").
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tors Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton proposed federal legislation
that would have provided grants and technical assistance for providers
that adopted disclosure and offer programs. 438 But disclosure and offer
is not a new idea. Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has long supported
legislation to provide incentives for providers to offer a prompt tender
for economic damages.43 9 Under the current version, the provider
could, within 180 days after a claim is filed, offer an injured patient
periodic payments to cover net economic losses as accrued, including
medical expenses, lost wages and rehabilitation expenses incurred due
to the injury not otherwise covered by insurance.440 If the offer is re-
jected by the patient, then the case would be tried under a gross negli-
gence standard and the patient would be required to prove fault be-
yond a reasonable doubt."1
In an empirical study focusing on closed claims in Florida and
Texas between 1998 and 2002, Hersch et al. (2007) found that early
offer could accelerate payment of claims by two years and reduce
overall insurer and litigation costs by $100,000 to $200,000 per
claim.442 But in their own empirical study, Black et al. (2009) take
issue with this finding and conclude that the savings are overstated:
while early offer would significantly reduce payouts in cases with low
economic damages, it would not significantly affect payouts in other
cases. 443 They find that there would be even less of an impact in
states with damages caps." In a reply, Hersch et al. (2010) question
the methodology used by Black et al. (2009) and reassert their original
findings." 5 The debate is continued in Black et al. (20 10).46 But re-
gardless of the impact of early offer on costs, O'Connell has identified
438 Hillary Rodham Clinton & Barack Obama, Making Patient Safety the
Centerpiece ofLiability Reform, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2205, 2207 (2006).
439 See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell et al., An Economic Model Costing "Early
Offers" Medical Malpractice Reform: Trading Noneconomic Damages for Prompt
Payment of Economic Damages, 35 NEW MEX. L. REV. 259 (2005); Jeffrey
O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims by
Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U. L. REV.
589(1982).
440 Jeffrey O'Connell, Commentary: Binding Early Offers Versus Caps for
Medical Malpractice Claims, 85 MILBANK Q. 287, 288-89 (2007).
4" Id. at 289.
442 Hersch et al., supra note 26, at s256.
44 Bernard Black et al., The Effects of "Early Offers" in Medical Malpractice
Cases: Evidence from Texas, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 723, 75 8-59 (2009).
4" Id. at 738-39.
Joni Hersch et al., Reply to the "Effects of 'Early Offers' in Medical Mal-
practice Cases: Evidence from Texas," 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 164 (2010).
446 Bernard Black et al., O'Connell Early Settlement Offers: Toward Realistic
Numbers and Two-Sided Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 379 (2010).
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a significant advantage that early offer has over damages caps: ". . .
unlike with caps, claimants who received an early offer would be
guaranteed prompt payment of their economic losses, plus their attor-
neys' fees."
Unlike early offer, an institutional or insurer initiated disclosure
and offer protocol does not require legislation. Proponents of disclo-
sure and offer approaches point to successful implementation of such
protocols by University of Michigan Health System, the Lexington,
Kentucky, Veterans Affairs (V.A.) Hospital, and the 3Rs program
operated by COPIC Insurance, a Colorado physician-directed medical
liability insurer.4 Proponents of disclosure and offer have argued that
it will reduce the number of malpractice claims and the costs to the
health care system. But Studdert et al. (2007) found, using a Monte
Carlo simulation model, that due to under-claiming in the current sys-
tem, widespread use of disclosure is likely to trigger additional mal-
practice claiming by negligently injured patients." 9 Boothman et al.
(2010), however, argue that the concerns voiced by Studdert et al.
(2007) have been refuted by the experience of the University of Mich-
igan Health System. 4 50 They report that implementation of the Michi-
gan disclosure and offer protocol has resulted in a significant decrease
in the number of claims and a reduction in litigation costs. 451 In addi-
tion, the University of Illinois at Chicago Medical Center, using a
protocol similar to the Michigan protocol, reports no increase in
claims or loss payouts due to full disclosure.452
The Michigan program is based on three principles:
1. Compensate quickly and fairly when unreasonable medical
care causes injury.
2. Defend medically reasonable care vigorously.
3. Reduce patient injuries (and therefore claims) by learning
from patients' experiences.4 53
" O'Connell, supra note 440, at 289 (emphasis in original).
448 Mello & Gallagher, supra note 425, at 1354.
449 David M. Studdert et al., Disclosure of Medical Injury To Patients: An
Improbable Risk Management Strategy, 26 HEALTH AFF. 215 (2007).
450 Boothman et al., supra note 436, at 159.
451 Id. at 143-44.
452 Timothy McDonald et al., Responding to Patient Safety Incidents: The
"Seven Pillars, " 19 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE el1, at 4 (2010), available at
http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/19/6/1.31.full.pdf.
453 Boothman et al., supra note 436, at 139.
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The basis for compensation under the Michigan program is a de-
termination that the patient has received unreasonable treatment. This
determination is made after an in-depth investigation by the risk man-
agement department.454 This is followed by a committee review of the
risk management department's determination that focuses on two
questions: "(1) Was the care at issue reasonable under the circum-
stances? and (2) Did the care adversely impact the patient's out-
come?" 455
The Lexington V.A. program has also been touted as a success.
Since 1995, the Department of Veteran Affairs has required all its
facilities to notify patients when they have experienced a negligently
inflicted iatrogenic injury, but the Lexington V.A. Hospital has fol-
lowed this policy since 1987.456 Kraman & Hamm (1999) found that
"[d]espite following a policy that seems to be designed to maximize
malpractice claims, the Lexington facility's liability payments have
been moderate and are comparable to those of similar facilities."457
They believe that these results were due to a dampening of the pa-
458tient's desire for revenge.
Another program that has been widely discussed is COPIC's 3Rs
Program. It uses the following principles: "Recognize Unanticipated
Event;" "Respond Soon After Event;" and "Resolve Related Is-
sues." 459 The 3Rs program was initiated in 2000 and is a no fault sys-
tem.460 Participation by the physician is voluntary. The program is
administered by the insurer's risk management department rather than
the claims department and is considered a "first party supplemental
benefit" rather than a "third party insurance payment." 46 1 It provides
up to $25,000 for out-of-pocket damages and up to $5,000 for loss of
462time. The process is initiated with an incident report by the physi-
cian, but there is no attempt to determine whether the injury was neg-
ligently inflicted.463 Death cases and cases involving egregious negli-
454 Id. at 139-40.
455 Id. at 140.
456 Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty
May Be the Best Policy, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 963, 964 (1999).
457 Id. at 965-66.
458 Id. at 966.
459 Richard Quinn, COPIC's 3Rs Program: Recognize, Respond To, and
Resolve Patient Injury, PowerPoint Presentation, available at
http://www.sorryworks.net/files/3rsaosreq.ppt, (cited in Boothman et al., supra note
436, at 147).
460 Richard E. Quinn & Mary C. Eichler, The 3Rs Program: The Colorado
Experience, 51 CLINICAL OBs. & GYN. 709, 710 (2008).
461 id.
462 id.
463 Id. at 712.
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gence are excluded from the program.4 6It does not require the patient
to waive the right to sue in order to receive compensation, but the
program is not available if the patient has retained an attorney, filed a
written demand for compensation, or initiated a court proceeding.465 it
does require the physician to disclose the injury and apologize to the
466patient.
A March 2004 report by issued by COPIC on the 3Rs program
boasted: "As one can see, 3Rs cases-where payments average
$1,820-appear to be an effective use of funds. In addition numerous
anecdotes of patient gratitude and physician satisfaction have been
received." 467 Quinn & Eichler (2008) report that from the inception of
the program until October 1, 2007, 1,110 patients had received pay-
ments with the average payment being $5,258.468 They believe that
open disclosure was instrumental in resolving some cases without
payment. 469 They also report positive feedback from physicians and
patients that have participated in the program and that COPIC is "well
pleased" with its results. 4 70 It seems that the sole focus of the COPIC
3Rs program is to reduce loss payouts. While a strong business case
could be made for the adoption of the program, it would not seem to
do much for improving the fairness of compensation or deterring neg-
ligence.
As noted by Mello and Gallagher (2010), the COPIC and Michi-
gan programs take quite different approaches: the COPIC model of-
fers a low level of reimbursement for loss of time and out-of-pocket
expenses without investigation of provider negligence or waiver of a
right to sue, while the Michigan program offers higher levels of reim-
bursement for all traditional damages components in cases of unrea-
sonable care and patients who accept the offer waive their right to
sue.4 7 ' And while the Michigan and V.A. programs provide opportu-
nities to improve patient safety by identifying preventable injuries due
to negligence, the COPIC program makes no attempt to identify neg-
46 Id. at 710.
4 Id.
466 Id. at 713.
467 COPIC INs. Co., A Success Story, COPIC's 3Rs PROGRAM, Mar. 2004,
available at
http://www.callcopic.com/resources/custom/PDF/3rs-newsletter/vol-1 -issue- 1-mar-
2004.pdf.
468 Quinn & Eichler, supra note 460, at 714.
469 id.
470 Id. at 716-18.
471 Mello & Gallagher, supra note 425, at 1354.
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ligent events and thus probably makes less of a contribution to im-
provements in patient safety.472
B. Health Courts
Recently, there has been a great deal of interest in the creation of
health courts that would replace judicial resolution of claims with an
administrative compensation scheme. In 2005, legislation with wide-
spread bipartisan support was introduced in both houses of Congress
to authorize federally funded health court demonstration projects.473
In 2006, Common Good, a non-partisan coalition that focuses on ad-
vocacy of legal reforms, proposed the creation of a system of federal
health courts to supplant state courts in adjudicating medical malprac-
tice disputes, 474 but the constitutionality of this proposal has been
questioned.47 5 While the ABA has rejected mandatory health courts as
an option,476 such a proposal has been endorsed by the AMA as a
"promising" approach.477 In 2008, Common Good, recognizing the
unfavorable political environment for federally mandated health
courts, proposed an approach based on contract and utilizing the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act.478
As with the disclosure and offer proposal, health courts are not a
new type of proposal. There have been several such proposals since
the 1970s, including the AMA's 1988 fault-based administrative
472 Boothman et al., supra note 436, at 148.
473 Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1337, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006);
Medical Liability Procedural Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 1546, 109th Cong. (2006);
Press Release, Common Good, Bipartisan Legislation to Create Special Health Courts
is Introduced in U.S. Senate (Jun. 30, 2005), available at
http://commongood.org/healthcare-newscommentary-inthenews-24 1.html.
474 Philip K. Howard, America Needs a New System of Medical Justice, 91
BULL. Am. COLL. SURGEONS 12 (2006), available at
http://www.facs.org/fellows info/bulletin/2006/howard0506.pdf.
475 Compare E. Donald Elliott et al., Administrative "Health Court"for Med-
ical Injury Claims: The Federal Constitutional Issues, 33 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y. & L.
761 (2008) (arguing for constitutionality), with Amy Widman & Francine A.
Hochberg, Federal Administrative Health Courts Are Unconstitutional: A Reply to
Elliott, Narayan & Nasmith, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y. & L. 799 (2008).
476 Health Courts, A.B.A. GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS OFFICE (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmentallegislative work/prioritiespoli
cy/health care law/healthcourts.html.
477 Press Release, Am. Med. Ass'n, AMA Adopts Principles for Health
Courts, (Jun. 27, 2007), http://commongood.org/healthcare-newscommentary-
inthenews-360.html.
478 Common Good, Creating Health Courts Through Consent: Opportunities
and Challenges for a Non-Legislative Approach to Administrative Injury Compensa-
tion, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (July 2008),
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/695 I Ocreatinghealthcourts.pdf.
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compensation scheme, discussed supra. The current proposal was
developed by Common Good, working in conjunction with the Har-
vard School of Public Health. 47 9 As they describe it:
A health court is a system of administrative compensation for
medical injuries. It has five core features. First, injury com-
pensation decisions are made outside the regular court system
by specially trained judges. Second, compensation decisions
are based on a standard of care that is broader than the negli-
gence standard (but does not approach strict liability).
'Avoidability' or 'preventability' of the injury is the touch-
stone. To obtain compensation, claimants must show that the
injury would not have occurred if best practices had been fol-
lowed or an optimal system of care had been in place, but
they need not show that care fell below the standard expected
of a reasonable practitioner. Third, compensation criteria are
based on evidence; that is, they are grounded in experts' in-
terpretations of the leading scientific literature. To the maxi-
mum extent feasible, compensation decisions are guided by ex
ante determinations about the preventability of common med-
ical adverse events. Fourth, this knowledge, coupled with
precedent, is converted to decision aids that allow fast-track
compensation decisions for certain types of injury. Fifth and
finally, ex ante guidelines also inform decisions about how
much for economic and noneconomic damages should be
paid.480
Proponents of health courts claim that they would be, on balance,
beneficial to patients, noting that health courts are more procedurally
fair, patients would be more likely to get a favorable result, compen-
sation is faster, the pool of compensable events is expanded, caps are
replaced with more flexible scheduled recoveries, disclosure of ad-
verse events is required, and patients with small claims benefit be-
cause attorneys are not required. 481 They also contend that insurers
and providers will benefit. There will be greater fairness and con-
sistency in decisions, and the courts will offer a better opportunity for
cost control measures.482 They contend that the greatest benefits will
be: (1) the improvements in patient safety due to increased candor and
479 Michelle M. Mello et al., "Health Courts" and Accountability for Patient
Safety, 84 MILBANK Q. 459 (2006).
480 Id. at 460-61.
481 Id. at 468.
482 Id.at 469-70.
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transparency in confronting errors resulting from the shift from the
stigmatizing negligence standard to the avoidabilty standard, (2) an
increase in the number of legitimate claims in the system, (3) clearer
ex ante standards, (4) and fairer decisions.4 83 They argue that hospitals
would have increased incentives to enhance safety because payments
into the system would be based on the frequency of avoidable injuries
experienced in the hospital.484 And state level scrutiny would also be
enhanced because the health court system would provide a central
repository of information that could be used by researchers and a state
patient safety office to improve patient safety.485 Eventually, data
from the states could be integrated into a national database.4 86 Propo-
nents of health courts have recognized that establishing the link be-
tween health courts and improvements in patient safety is critical to
the success of the proposal.487
While the Common Good proposal seems to be an improvement
over the earlier AMA proposal, it is nonetheless disappointing to
those who have advocated a shift to no-fault and enterprise liability.4 88
The proposal has also been controversial among academicians. Peters
foresees only marginal improvements in the accuracy of decision
making and fairness of outcomes. 48 9 He believes that health courts are
likely to exacerbate current problems such as under-claiming (for le-
gitimate claims) and over-claiming (for baseless claims). 49 0 He be-
lieves that the level of procedural protections provided to patients in
health courts is inadequate and should be strengthened. 49 ' And he is
skeptical about the purported improvements in patient safety and fore-
sees little change in the willingness of physicians to disclose errors as
a result of implementation of health courts. 4 92 Baker has characterized
health courts as "part of the same 'doctor knows best' approach to
malpractice that has produced the error-ridden system that we have
today. It's an effort to neutralize malpractice litigation, the institution
that deserves almost all the credit for bringing medical malpractice to
light." 4 93 Even health court proponents recognize that their potential
483 Id. at 473-74.
484 Id. at 475.
485 Id at 476-78.
486 Id at 482-83.
487 Paul J. Barringer et al., Administrative Compensation of Medical Injuries:
A Hardy Perennial Blooms Again, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 725, 751 (2008).
488 Peters, supra note 24, at 236.
489 Id. at 251-52.
490 Id. at 258.
491 Id. at 268.
492 Id. at 270-78.
493 Kristin Eliasberg, Malpractice Fix, Bos. GLOBE, Aug. 21, 2005, at El.
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benefits are uncertain and have recommended a series of small scale
demonstrations to test their effectiveness.494
CONCLUSION
By providing guaranteed access to health care insurance at com-
munity rates, the ACA could reduce the problem of under-
compensation resulting from damages caps, but it could also weaken
deterrence by exacerbating the problem of under-claiming in the cur-
rent medical liability system, and shifting losses from liability insurers
to health insurers. At this time, it is uncertain whether damages caps
will be enacted at the federal level. While some Republicans in Con-
gress will continue to press for adoption of a federal damages cap,495
there is a new development in the Republican party: some tea party
activists believe that a federal damages caps would violate the Tenth
Amendment.49 6 Caps disadvantage the most severely injured patients
in return for the promise of lower health care costs for all.497 But not-
withstanding recent opinions offered by the CBO, it is not clear that
caps will significantly reduce health care costs or that any savings will
be passed on to consumers. Moreover, the impact of damages caps on
access to physicians and patient safety is unclear. The benefits of al-
ternative reforms such as disclosure and offer and health courts are
also uncertain. Perhaps we will know more after several demonstra-
tion projects are conducted.
494 Mello et al., supra note 479, at 487.
495 See, e.g., Medical Justice Act of 2011, H.R. 896, 112th Cong.
496 Julian Pequet, GOP Clashes Over Medical Malpractice, THE HILL (Feb. 2,
2011, 2:03 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/state-issues/143009-tea-party-
influence-sparks-gop-clash-over-tort-reform?tmpl=component&print=I &page=.
497 Nelson, Morrisey & Kilgore (2007), supra note 41, at 281.
2011] 519

